# Texas v Mo State – round 5 NEG

## 1NC

### topicality

#### Financial incentives are funding, loans, or loan guarantees --- Purchase agreement is non-financial

Czinkota 2009 - Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69)

Financial incentives offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. Non financial incentives include guaranteed government purchases, special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

#### Vote negative

#### 1. Limits --- they add many new mechanisms, multiplied by type of fuels this makes the topic limitless

Dyson 2003 – International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Megan, Flow: The Essentials of Environmental Flows, p. 67-68)

Understanding of the term “incentives” varies and economists have produced numerous typologies. A brief characterization of incentives is therefore warranted. First the term is understood by economists as incorporating both positive and negative aspects, for example, a tax that leads a consumer to give up an activity is an incentive, not a disincentive or negative incentive. Second, although incentives are also construed purely in economic terms, incentives refer to more than just financial rewards and penalties. They are the “positive and negative changes in outcomes that individuals perceive as likely to result from particular actions taken within a set of rules in a particular physical and social context” Third, it is possible to distinguish between direct and indirect incentives, with direct incentives referring to financial or other inducements and indirect incentives referring to both variable and enabling incentives. Finally, incentives of any kind may be called “perverse” where they work against their purported aims or have significant adverse side effects. Direct incentives lead people, groups, and organizations to take particular action or inaction. In the case of environmental flows these are the same as the net gains and losses that different stakeholders experience. The key challenge is to ensure that the incentives are consistent with the achievement of environmental flows. This implies the need to compensate those that incur additional costs by providing them with the appropriate payment or other compensation. Thus farmers asked to give up irrigation water to which they have an estabilished property or use right are likely to require a payment for ceding this right. The question, of course, is how to obtain the financing necessary to cover the costs of developing such transactions and the transaction itself. Variable incentives are policy instruments that affect the relative costs and benefits of different economic activities. As such, they can be manipulated to affect the behavior of the producer or consumer. For example, a government subsidy on farm inputs will increase the relative profitability of agricultural products, hence probably increasing the demand for irrigation water. Variable incentives therefore have the ability to greatly increase or reduce the demand for out of stream as well as in stream uses of water. The number of these instruments within the realm of economic and fiscal policy is practically limitless.

#### 2. Ground --- the mechanism is the core of Neg preparation --- they steal links to spending, politics, trade-off DAs, non-financial counterplans and they allow indirect effects that allow the Aff to be outside the energy sector --- core ground is key to fairness

### politics

#### Obama is in perfect position on the debt ceiling

Klein 1-2 [Ezra Klein 1-2-2013 Washington Post “Calm down, liberals. The White House won” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/02/calm-down-liberals-the-white-house-got-a-good-deal-on-the-fiscal-cliff/]

Fourth, I don’t think the White House has a shred of credibility when they say they won’t negotiate over the debt ceiling. They may not call what they’re about to do negotiating over the debt ceiling, but that’ll be what they’re doing. That said, I’m quite convinced that they don’t intend to be held hostage over the debt ceiling. As a former constitutional law professor, the president sees himself as a steward of the executive branch and is deeply hostile to setting the precedent that congressional minorities can hold presidents hostage through the debt ceiling. At some point in the coming talks, Boehner or McConnell or both are going to realize that the White House really, seriously will not accept a bargain in which what they “got” was an increase in the debt limit, and so they’re going to have to decide at that point whether to crash the global economy.¶ Fifth, the constellation of economic interest groups that converge on Washington understands the debt ceiling better than they did in 2011, are becoming more and more tired of congress’s tendency to negotiate by threatening to trigger economic catastrophes, and is getting better at knowing who to blame. It’s not a meaningless sign that John Engler, the former Republican Governor of Michigan who now leads the Business Roundtable, called for a five-year solution to the debt ceiling. ¶ It’s worth keeping this in perspective: All it means is that the White House can potentially demand a perfectly reasonable compromise of one dollar in revenue-generating tax reform for every dollar in spending cuts. When you add in the fiscal cliff deal, and the 2011 Budget Control Act, that’ll still mean that the total deficit reduction enacted over the last few years tilts heavily towards spending, particularly once you account for reduced war costs. ¶ But that is, arguably, another reason that the White House isn’t in such a bad position here: They’ve set up a definition of success that will sound reasonable to most people — a dollar in tax reform for a dollar in spending cuts — while the Republicans have a very unreasonable sounding definition, in which they get huge cuts to Medicare or they force the United States into default. So while it’s possible that the White House will crumble, rendering itself impotent in negotiations going forward, and while it’s possible that the we’ll breach the debt ceiling, both possibilities seem less likely than Republicans agreeing to a deal that pairs revenue-generating tax reform with spending cuts.

#### SMRs are politically “nuclear”

Fairley 10 Peter, IEEE Spectrum, May, "Downsizing Nuclear Power Plants,” [spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/downsizing-nuclear-power-plants/0](http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/downsizing-nuclear-power-plants/0)

However, there are political objections to SMRs. Precisely because they are more affordable, they may well increase the risk of proliferation by bringing the cost and power output of nuclear reactors within the reach of poorer countries.¶ Russia’s first SMR, which the nuclear engineering group Rosatom expects to complete next year, is of particular concern. The Akademik Lomonosov is a floating nuclear power plant sporting two 35-MW reactors, which Rosatom expects to have tethered to an Arctic oil and gas operation by 2012. The reactor’s portability prompted Greenpeace Russia to call this floating plant the world’s most dangerous nuclear project in a decade.¶ SMRs may be smaller than today’s reactors. But, politically at least, they’re just as nuclear.

#### Obama PC is key - failure collapses the global economy

Maass 1-2 [Harold Maass 1-2-2013 The Week “The looming debt-ceiling fight: Worse than the fiscal cliff?” http://theweek.com/article/index/238312/the-looming-debt-ceiling-fight-worse-than-the-fiscal-cliff]

Since the agreement heading for Obama's desk doesn't raise the debt ceiling, which we've already hit, says Zachary A. Goldfarb at The Washington Post, it leaves "the Treasury to use what it calls 'extraordinary measures' as long as it can to pay the government's bills." When the bean counters run out of tricks, we could face a "catastrophic default" if Congress doesn't act fast.¶ In many ways, the threat of default in two months is a more serious risk than the Jan. 1 fiscal cliff deadline. If Congress does not increase the debt ceiling, the government will quickly run out of ways to pay the nation's bills and make interest payments on the nation’s outstanding debt. Any failure by the government to meet its financial obligations could be seen as a default, shaking world financial markets, given the special role that U.S. government bonds play in the global economy.¶ Obama is still smarting from the 2011 debt-ceiling dispute, says Neil Munro at The Daily Caller. In that fight, "the GOP eventually pressured him to accept spending curbs in exchange for an increase to the debt limit up to $16.4 trillion." Obama has been complaining about that defeat ever since, and he's vowing not to let it happen again. But the GOP-led House is adamant about using "its authority over the nation's debt ceiling to pressure Obama to shrink future spending."

#### Economic decline causes nuclear conflict

Mathew J. Burrows (counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC), PhD in European History from Cambridge University) and Jennifer Harris (a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit) April 2009 “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr\_Burrows.pdf

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groupsinheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksand newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### reg-neg CP

#### TEXT: Congressional rulemaking bodies should facilitate regulatory negotiations with relevant parties over the following proposal: The United States Department of Defense should substantially increase power purchase agreements for energy production in the United States from light water small modular reactors. The negotiated policy will subsequently be implemented.

#### CP Competes: Does not result in the 1AC, open process

Gary Endelman, Senior Associate at Fong & Associates, “Go as Far as You Can: How Negotiated Rulemaking in Immigration Benefits America: Part 2 of 2,” Immigration Daily, July 1, 2003, [http://www.ilw.com/articles/2003,0718-endelman.shtm#bio](http://www.ilw.com/articles/2003%2C0718-endelman.shtm#bio), accessed 10-5-2012.

Those who believe, as I do, that immigration is good for America have their principles right. Our challenge is to translate these principles into practice. If America is to move beyond paralysis and create a national immigration policy that works for all of us, we who most champion immigration must engage in the down and dirty work of building true alternatives to traditional rulemaking. Right now, there is such a balance of will between competing factions, the forces for and against positive change are so evenly balanced, that only a third way with absolute clarity of vision can chart a path forward towards sustainable compromise. Negotiated rulemaking is that third way. Absent this, precisely because any meaningful progress seems so remote, ideological combatants shrink back from assuming the very real risks that progress demands.

#### Reg negs are key to expanding nuclear – mineral, siting, mining, waste, security

IAEA, “Uranium production and raw materials for the nuclear fuel cycle–Supply and demand, economics, the environment and energy security,” Proceeding Series, June 2005, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/77476229/Uranium-Production-Raw-Materials-for-Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle-Supply-Demand-Economics-Environment-Energy-Security>, accessed 9-13-2012.

We propose that the indicator mix for any site-level or sector-level CSR reporting process should respect a principle of “representative diversity”. We use this term in an intuitive way, to mean that no important consideration should be omitted. For example, it is essential to maintain the “Representative Diversity” of indicators that signal the “specificities” of individual stakeholder groups and the full spectrum of performance issues. We can also express this as a principle of ¶ ¶ equitable stakeholder visibility. This is not a purely quantitative equity. As in other forms of industrial bargaining or multi-stakeholder negotiations, compromises can be made if honour is preserved. Just as important as the retention of an individually “preferred” indicator, is the visible trace of the deliberation process and of the meaningful participation of the cross-section of stakeholders [4]. CSR reporting is not an end in itself; it is an input to wider stakeholder dialogue and governance, and it is a reference point for forward planning, investment and other strategic decisions for the plant management, companies and industrial sectors concerned. In project planning contexts, there is generally a need to identify, appraise and choose amongst the various different options or courses of action that present themselves. The different protagonists concerned will have divergent views about what is their interest, their right or their due; and they may also propose quite different principles for deciding what to do or what “should” be done. There are various degrees of uncertainty due partly to technological and natural system complexity and partly to ‘social’ indeterminacies. In this context of “complexity”, a pragmatic and robust evaluation approach is to frame the problem of ‘social choice’ as a multi-stakeholder deliberation about the merits and demerits of policy alternatives that present themselves to the society. A comparison of project or regulatory policy options (e.g., mine site development, or post-mine site management regimes, etc.) can be developed in terms of:¶ 1.¶ ¶ The exploration of options: Minerals exploitation strategies, site rehabilitation, radioactivewaste policy or other strategic perspectives are explored in terms of a small number of scenarios each of which expresses distinct technological, economic and governance features.2.¶ ¶ The diversity of stakeholders: The scenarios of distinct possible futures are to be evaluated explicitly from as many distinct stakeholder perspectives as seem germane to the task.3.¶ ¶ Multiple evaluation criteria: The stakeholders will make evaluations of each scenario interms of a range of key performance issues, using a variety of different criteria reflecting the spread of societal concerns.¶ This leads to a three-dimensional¶ Deliberation Matrix¶ (Fig. 1) as an intuitive framework for organising the judgements offered by each category of stakeholders, for each of a variety of scenarios, across a spectrum of governance or performance issues. The hypothesis is that, as the multiple perspectives are brought to bear on a common ground (viz., the scenario set) then the tensions, conflicts of interests, uncertainties and dissent (amongst scientists as well as decision makers, administrators and stakeholders from different walks of commercial activity and civil society) can be articulated and explored in a structured way. The participatory ‘evaluation’ activity proceeds through the step-by-step phase, which can be undertaken on an individual or a collective basis within the group, of the filling out of cells of the Deliberation Matrix. Individual reflection and/or exchanges of views between protagonists in a deliberation/negotiation process may lead to modifications at any or all or the steps of the choices and judgements.

### communities DA

#### Uniqueness and issue specific spillover – military bases pursuing strong and collaborative local community relations now - key to solve land encroachment issues vital to military effectiveness - but energy siting decisions that cause local community backlash specifically spillover and undermine relationships

Boccuti, Faul and Gray, 12

Amanda Boccuti, GIS Support Analyst, Marstel-Day, LLC, providing analysis and GIS support for U.S. Marine Corps projects. Lauren Faul, Specializing in Strategic Communications Analyst, Marstel-Day, LLC, Her primary responsibilities entail the development of engagement plans for the U.S. Marine Corps which will provide them a framework to sustain the missions through community outreach and engagement. She has previously worked as a Communications Director on Capitol Hill and Congressional Liaison for the Marine Corps. Lauren Gray, Environmental Issues Researcher, Marstel-Day, LLC, offering research and analysis of environmental issues for encroachment control plans and communications, outreach and engagement strategies for the U.S. Marine Corps. Her primary focus areas include climate change effects and energy development, 5/21/12, http://engagingcities.com/article/establishing-creative-strategies-effective-engagement-between-military-installations-communi

Throughout the Nation’s history, military installations and ranges were historically established in undeveloped areas, except for those forts located to defend cities. Local communities developed near the installations for safety and economic reasons resulting in the installation being the up-to-that-point rural community’s primary economic engine. Routine communication between the installations and local communities were minimal because the installation was self-supporting and not subject to local laws and regulations. Communications were primarily social. Starting in the post-World War II era and accelerating as the 20th Century came to a close, installation-adjacent communities increased in both density and size – becoming less rural, more suburban or urban, and more economically diverse.¶ ¶ Military missions continue to evolve, incorporating new weapon platforms and training over larger areas and at all hours of the day and night. These changes in both surrounding communities and the installation missions have often lead to competing interests with respect to the economy, natural resource management, and land use. Military installations and local communities must, therefore, focus communication efforts on building partnerships to find mutually acceptable paths forward for resolving their competing interests. Developing collaborative relationships is imperative to turning otherwise conflicting interests into opportunities for mutually beneficial solutions. The nature of those interactions is defined by issue type, installation and community rapport, and available communication channels.¶ ¶ The four military services (i.e., Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force) have service-specific community engagement programs to develop partnerships; all four, however, conduct information sharing through the Public Affairs Office (PAO), which handles media and public relations. Three of the services – the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force – have established encroachment management policies that outline service responsibilities to establish, maintain, and sustain community relationships in order to reduce encroachment effects. This responsibility is usually assigned to a Community Plans and Liaison Office (CPLO) or an equivalent community planner. The CPLO and PAO work with their installation Commander to act as the military’s voice and point of engagement in the community through consistent messaging, establishing an installation presence in community forums, and planning community-engagement events and processes.¶ ¶ Though Department of Defense (DoD) mechanisms exist to develop community partnerships, mediating the different interests and priorities among military installations and their surrounding communities is a complex, nuanced process usually exercised by the services, through their installation leadership. Siting of renewable energy projects, environmental stewardship responsibilities, noise from training events, and other policy- and planning-related matters invoke difficult questions, such as: how can an installation and its surrounding communities concurrently pursue goals and development in a way that lead to mutual gain, obtaining threshold requirements and fair compromise? Finding interest nexuses and fostering an open, strong relationship in which those nexuses can be explored is key.

#### We have several links

#### Local community backlash - Even your solvency advocates admit the link is true and highly likely

Andres and Breetz 11Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, and Hanna Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactorsfor Military Installations:Capabilities, Costs, andTechnological Implications, www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf

Small reactors used on domestic military bases are ¶ likely to face a number of additional siting hurdles. As a ¶ distributed energy source, they are likely to face substantial “not-in-my-backyard” battles. Moreover, dispersing a ¶ large number of reactors leads to questions about longterm nuclear waste disposal.¶ 27¶ Arguably, reactors should be ¶ relatively safe on domestic military installations, certainly ¶ more secure than, for instance, the reactors situated in developing countries or intended for processing tar sands. ¶ Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple. ¶ Institutional and technical uncertainties—such as the security of sealed modules, the potential and unintended ¶ social and environmental consequences, or the design of ¶ reliable safeguards—make dispersing reactors across the ¶ country challenging. Some key issues that require consideration include securing sealed modules, determining how ¶ terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully ¶ considering the social and environmental consequences of ¶ dispersing reactors, and determining whether Permissive ¶ Action Links technology could be used to safeguard them

#### Plan sends critical signal of isolation to both local community and base officials - Military bases prioritizing community integration now

Parthemore and Rogers, 10 Christine Parthemore, Will Rogers, Center New American Security, 5/20, <http://www.cnas.org/node/4502>

Are small nuclear reactors a smart choice for increasing energy security and reducing greenhouse gas emissions at federal government facilities? In recent months this has become a hot question in particular at domestic U.S. military installations, which must meet unique energy needs while reducing their carbon footprints.¶ Now, it appears that this question is taking Capitol Hill by storm as well.¶ The media have reported that Tennessee Sen. Lamar Alexander (R) is proposing a joint Department of Energy/Department of Defense demonstration project to examine the use of small reactors on federal sites. For some Department of Energy sites, such as Oak Ridge National Lab in Alexander’s home state — a site certainly accustomed to housing nuclear technology — demonstrating new nuclear reactor technology is largely a no-brainer. However, using nuclear reactors to power the nation’s defense installations warrants deeper consideration.¶ Proponents of boosting this carbon-free energy source on military bases argue that these installations have unique capacities that would ease concerns over its use, namely more gates and more armed guards already on base 24/7. Likewise, the U.S. military services have unique energy security needs. Consistent energy supplies are a critical component of America’s ability to train at home and to operate globally. Energy is so important that some analysts are even exploring “islanding” the energy systems on some military installations to reduce vulnerabilities related to their reliance on often brittle domestic electric grids. Consideration of nuclear energy as part of these islanding concepts is on the rise.¶ On the other hand, opponents contend that sufficient numbers of military base personnel may not have the requisite training in nuclear reactor management, oversight and regulatory credentials to attend to reactors in the round-the-clock manner necessary. In most cases, additional qualified personnel and improved physical security and safety requirements would be needed. As with all nuclear power generation, materials proliferation, water usage, radioactive waste management and public opinion will also be major concerns.¶ Most military bases also strive to be integrated into their surrounding communities, and, by our experience, many base officials consider integrated electric infrastructure an important point of connection between local and military needs. Concepts for nuclear energy generation solely to supply military bases must be sensitive to what public perceptions could be in the event of extended blackouts for surrounding communities.¶ Any legislation to consider the option of small nuclear reactors on military bases must include examination of these important concerns.

#### Impact - strong local community relations key to buffering agreements that solve land encroachment – vital to military effectiveness and biodiversity protection

Powledge, 2008 Fred Powledge, writer and editor, Fred Powledge is the author of seventeen books and scores of magazine articles and reports. Powledge's articles have appeared in dozens of publications, including The New Yorker, Audubon, BioScience, and many others. They draw on his extensive experience as a journalist, which includes reporting as a staff member of The New York Times, the Atlanta Journal, and the Associated Press. He has served as a consultant to agricultural research institutions in Colombia, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Italy. He has contributed to biennial editions of World Resources, which is an authority on global environmental and development issues, and to several encyclopedias. Most recently, Fred Powledge has been the author of articles in the journal BioScience on a variety of important environmental subjects, .http://www.dodbiodiversity.org/ch10/Chapter.10.Partnerships.pp144-153.pdf

Buffering has become an important buzzword in military-community relations.¶ At most installations, civilian development and population growth make it highly¶ unlikely that the base itself can be enlarged, even though modern weaponry and¶ training techniques need expanded space. Thus was born the buffering idea.¶ 4¶ The Army led this movement in the nineteen-nineties by acquiring conservation easements on lands around Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that were suitable habitat for¶ the red-cockaded woodpecker.¶ 5¶ The Army eventually expanded and formalized¶ this strategy into the Army Compatible Use Buffer Program (acub).¶ The Marine Corps followed soon after by acquiring easements on land adjacent to its Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, also in North Carolina. In 2003,¶ the Department of Defense broadened the buffering idea to allow military departments (in the words of a dod document) to:¶ enter into an agreement with a state or private entity to limit development or property use that¶ is incompatible with the mission, to preserve habitat, or to relieve anticipated environmental¶ restrictions that would restrict, impede, or interfere with military training, testing, or operations on the installation.

#### Biodiversity loss causes extinction.

Ruth Young, 2-9-2010, Ph.D. in coastal marine ecology, “Biodiversity: what it is and why it’s important,” <http://www.talkingnature.com/2010/02/Biodiversity/Biodiversity-what-and-why/>

Different species within ecosystems fill particular roles, they all have a function, they all have a niche. They interact with each other and the physical environment to provide ecosystem services that are vital for our survival. For example plant species convert carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and energy from the sun into useful things such as food, medicines and timber. A bee pollinating a flower (Image: ClearlyAmbiguous Flickr) Pollination carried out by insects such as bees enables the production of ⅓ of our food crops. Diverse mangrove and coral reef ecosystems provide a wide variety of habitats that are essential for many fishery species. To make it simpler for economists to comprehend the magnitude of services offered by Biodiversity, a team of researchers estimated their value – it amounted to $US33 trillion per year. “By protecting Biodiversity we maintain ecosystem services” Certain species play a “keystone” role in maintaining ecosystem services. Similar to the removal of a keystone from an arch, the removal of these species can result in the collapse of an ecosystem and the subsequent removal of ecosystem services. The most well known example of this occurred during the 19th century when sea otters were almost hunted to extinction by fur traders along the west coast of the USA. This led to a population explosion in the sea otters’ main source of prey, sea urchins. Because the urchins graze on kelp their booming population decimated the underwater kelp forests. This loss of habitat led to declines in local fish populations. Sea otters are a keystone species once hunted for their fur (Image: Mike Baird) Eventually a treaty protecting sea otters allowed the numbers of otters to increase which inturn controlled the urchin population, leading to the recovery of the kelp forests and fish stocks. In other cases, ecosystem services are maintained by entire functional groups, such as apex predators (See Jeremy Hance’s post at Mongabay). During the last 35 years, over fishing of large shark species along the US Atlantic coast has led to a population explosion of skates and rays. These skates and rays eat bay scallops and their out of control population has led to the closure of a century long scallop fishery. These are just two examples demonstrating how Biodiversity can maintain the services that ecosystems provide for us, such as fisheries. One could argue that to maintain ecosystem services we don’t need to protect Biodiversity but rather, we only need to protect the species and functional groups that fill the keystone roles. However, there are a couple of problems with this idea. First of all, for most ecosystems we don’t know which species are the keystones! Ecosystems are so complex that we are still discovering which species play vital roles in maintaining them. In some cases its groups of species not just one species that are vital for the ecosystem. Second, even if we did complete the enormous task of identifying and protecting all keystone species, what back-up plan would we have if an unforseen event (e.g. pollution or disease) led to the demise of these ‘keystone’ species? Would there be another species to save the day and take over this role? Classifying some species as ‘keystone’ implies that the others are not important. This may lead to the non-keystone species being considered ecologically worthless and subsequently over-exploited. Sometimes we may not even know which species are likely to fill the keystone roles. An example of this was discovered on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef. This research examined what would happen to a coral reef if it were over-fished. The “over-fishing” was simulated by fencing off coral bommies thereby excluding and removing fish from them for three years. By the end of the experiment, the reefs had changed from a coral to an algae dominated ecosystem – the coral became overgrown with algae. When the time came to remove the fences the researchers expected herbivorous species of fish like the parrot fish (Scarus spp.) to eat the algae and enable the reef to switch back to a coral dominated ecosystem. But, surprisingly, the shift back to coral was driven by a supposed ‘unimportant’ species – the bat fish (Platax pinnatus). The bat fish was previously thought to feed on invertebrates – small crabs and shrimp, but when offered a big patch of algae it turned into a hungry herbivore – a cow of the sea – grazing the algae in no time. So a fish previously thought to be ‘unimportant’ is actually a keystone species in the recovery of coral reefs overgrown by algae! Who knows how many other species are out there with unknown ecosystem roles! In some cases it’s easy to see who the keystone species are but in many ecosystems seemingly unimportant or redundant species are also capable of changing niches and maintaining ecosystems. The more Biodiversityiverse an ecosystem is, the more likely these species will be present and the more resilient an ecosystem is to future impacts. Presently we’re only scratching the surface of understanding the full importance of Biodiversity and how it helps maintain ecosystem function. The scope of this task is immense. In the meantime, a wise insurance policy for maintaining ecosystem services would be to conserve Biodiversity. In doing so, we increase the chance of maintaining our ecosystem services in the event of future impacts such as disease, invasive species and of course, climate change. This is the international year of Biodiversity – a time to recognize that Biodiversity makes our survival on this planet possible and that our protection of Biodiversity maintains this service.

### militarity

#### The affirmative’s takes part in the naturalization of the military as the optimal mode of politics- this creates a Clauswitzian political sphere where war is the only political choice

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These stratocratic controls of planetary human activity reveal more than the ideology of a single administration; they are an extension of what we can now see as the complete devotion to an apparatus that captures all cultural and political energies in terms of what Clausewitz defined as "policy." The original state of "emergency" as defined by the Bush Administration in the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks has been naturalized and sedimented as to become a fundamental starting point of human existence. Consequently, understanding the full intensity of the age of militariality requires more than the common critical awareness of Clausewitz's central doctrine: "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means" (28). It requires first an understanding that for Clausewitz, war is the very ontological basis of human existence, a basis that transcends culture, history and temporality. War defines the very structure of human subjectivity, a juridico-natural "code of law" that is "deeply rooted" in a people, an army, a government: "war is a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy" (30). Clausewitz assigns a constituency to each of the registers of this trinity: "The first of these…mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government" [End Page 143] (30). In a totalizing problematic organized according to the idea of war serving as the basis of human existence, the people of a nation are equated with that of a blind primordial force of violence: "the first," which refers to "primordial violence, hatred, and enmity" identifies the people living in the nation. "Government" therefore names that entity constituted for the exclusive purpose of controlling its unstable citizenry by reorienting the energies of the people towards warfare. This reorientation lays the groundwork and delineates the horizon of human creativity, and determines the single legitimized space of freedom: the army, where the "creative spirit is free to roam." The space of instability, of chance, which is the condition for the possibility of creativity, enters into the war-footing picture of reality only on this register of militarized human activity. This connection here is not a matter of association; military activity defines the very essence of freedom and human creativity. The army and its state are not defined in this picture in traditional terms of democracy, protection, and service to a people. Nor are they the a sign of the discourse of biopower, for biopower has its eyes on the productivity of a population and functions according to a general administration of life that, although affecting "distributions around a norm," still invites and produces a certain amount of heterogeneity (Foucault 266). The army and the state are instead named as the necessary foundational machinic force that determines the war footing constitution of humanity, ensuring that all its energies are channeled in a single direction: "The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people" (Clausewitz 31). The government and the army, in fact, only arise and become increasingly indispensable as the movement of humans through history becomes more "civilized" and "intellectually developed": "In any primitive, warlike race, the warrior spirit is far more common than among civilized peoples. It is possessed by almost every warrior: but in civilized societies only necessity will stimulate it in the people as a whole, since they lack the natural disposition for it" (45). This explains the constant disdain for "intellectuals," for they are understood to be part of the general problem of the so-called civilizing process, the "general intellectual development of a given society" (45, italics in original). This intellectual development is a double-edged sword for Clausewitz and the war-footing polity. On the one hand Clausewitz must have access to at least a modicum of classificatory procedures, otherwise he would not be able to establish the lesser other whose constitution makes possible the essential act of war. On the other hand the non-primitive human consciousness must acquire "appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament" and not be distinguished by "great power(s) of meditation" (44, 48). Instead what is needed is "mental force," a "firmness" of opinion that does not waver: "We say a man has strength of character, or simply has character, if he sticks to his convictions….Such firmness cannot show itself, of course, if a man keeps changing his mind" (54, [End Page 144] emphasis in original).11 This affects the realm of knowledge production as well, for "Knowledge in war is very simple"; and a "high degree of education" simply leads to "ridiculous pedantry" (96, 95, emphasis in original). It is not that life and the political have collapsed in the total politicization of life, as Agamben argues, or not solely. This collapse is only one of the outcomes of the total militarization of the biopolitical settlement, of the bios. The civil bios has no role in this problematic; it does not even exist. In this characterization war, and not biopower, becomes the very basis of the political: "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse"; "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it" (28, 29). We can see the full manifestation of Clausewitz's polity as war in the truth-statements of militariality advocates. "Step 8" of War Footing, is clear: "Wage Political Warfare" (136). A month after 9/11 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld launched the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI). The OSI is "a component of a broader, government-wide strategic communications campaign, specifically [designed] to assist government agencies in crafting policy regarding the military aspects of information operations" (139). The program was shut down, but its advocates make it clear that it should be revived as soon as possible, on the grounds that its tight connection between information and militarization can bring about the planned unidirectional metaphysical orientation of warfare with greater speed than any other approach. Militariality sets up a program for direct political warfare and stands that against the "far more limited effort known as 'public diplomacy'": "even when they are well conceived and well executed...public diplomacy strategies will be a long-term effort. This is in their nature, given the reliance they place on such instruments as international media programming, exchange visits of political and cultural figures, humanitarian and development assistance, training future leaders, and so forth. Such efforts take years....And we do not have the luxury of time" (141). The suggestions for a plan of action include the immediate execution of a political warfare strategy, the drafting of legislative vehicles for political warfare, the strengthening of CIA clandestine services, the housing of the primary responsibility for political warfare in the Department of Defense, and the direct use of the Internet as a tool of political warfare (143–145). The consequences to be drawn from all of this are severe. Information in the post-9/11 state of constant "emergency" generated by the government of the Bush administration and its war footing organizations must now be identified as organizing not only the general political arrangement of life but the greater and more amorphous register of civil existence as well. It is in this sense that we are witnessing the creation of a new World Stratocratic Picture, a new totality, one that has its telos in the total control of the totality (the subtext of the above passage concerning diplomacy is its dependency on an actual engagement with an international community, a dependency that violates the [End Page 145] unilateral orientation adhering to the decision-making process of the military polity). In the creation of a totality capable of being totally controlled the indissoluble connection between the political and the civil changes dramatically. It can no longer be said that the civil is indirectly tied to the political. The line between the two may never have been solid, but in the "state of exception," which installs a justification for acting "outside the normal order" of a democratic polity, sites of human production, knowledge, information, media reports, entertainment, the Internet, defense, militarization, representation, and human consciousness itself, all flow in and out of one another so as to confuse any possibility of making clear distinctions between them. The political regime, progressively acting directly on the civil register, diminishes the civil register to the point of its eventual erasure. With the erosion of the civil register it becomes clearer that metamilitarization appears increasingly as an essential technique of the polity rather than an exceptional measure. A war footing philosophy thus becomes the very constitutive paradigm of remaining popular civil institutions such as the media and film production. Sound bite culture is only one sign of this.

#### This creates the psychological priming for conflict- most probable explanation for why we go to war

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4 (Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative. This rejection opens up spaces to create discourses alternative to the American exceptional military project

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All of these transformations owe their existence, of course, to a long and complex history that cannot be articulated in the space available here. The cords of militariality extend back to a number of historical developments in ontological thought, judiciary systems, agricultural reorganizations, sovereign displacements, national reterritorializations, economic restructurings, and the colonial expansions that have generated today's international community. These cords are more difficult to see than those present in the stratocracy itself—one fact of militariality's character that opens a pathway for a real awareness of its increasing excessiveness and thus the potential for resistances to develop across ethnic, religious, and national lines. The paradox of militariality's strength and simultaneous fragility is precisely this visible excessiveness, which is part of its self-destructive essence. The greater problem is in some sense the development of a general awareness of those previously-existing discourses of modern liberal humanism that so easily establish, time and again, the stratocratic polities of the modern era. Even so, the visible nature of these cords of militariality—its direct daylight attacks on and incarcerations of foreign and domestic constituencies, its fully mediatized legal signings, its denouncements of the educational system and the international community—should not be understood as lacking in power. Any criticism of militariality will need to take into consideration the heavy economic, material, and faith-based investments in its project and continual existence. These investments hide the stratocracy's hysterization of the [End Page 147] polity with the general concept of necessity: it is necessary to take this action because we are under attack.12 But, if it still can be said that democracy owes its existence to the kind of interrogative thinking that challenges the unrelenting necessities forced on human existence, then it may come to be known that necessity will be the end of democracy, and the constabularies of militariality the architects of this end.

### grid adv

#### Grid resilient- Even worst case scenario it doesn’t hurt the military

Lewis 2010 (James Andrew Lewis, senior fellow and director of the Technology and Public Policy Program CSIS, March 2010, “The Electrical Grid as a Target for Cyber Attack,” http://csis.org/files/publication/100322\_ElectricalGridAsATargetforCyberAttack.pdf)

This conclusion is different from the strategic consequences on a cyber attack on the power grid. The United States routinely suffers blackouts. The nation does not collapse. In the short term, military power and economic strength are not noticeably affected - a good example for opponents to consider is Hurricane Katrina, which caused massive damage but did not degrade U.S. military power in or even long-term economic performance. Is there any cyber attack that could match the hurricane?¶ The United States is a very large collection of targets with many different pieces making up its electrical infrastructure. While a single attack could interrupt service, the large size and complexity of the American economy make it more resilient. Even without a Federal response plan, the ability of electrical companies to work quickly together to restore service is impressive and we should not underestimate the ingenuity of targets to recover much more rapidly than expected. This is a routine occurrence in aerial bombing: impressive damage is quickly rectified by a determined opponent.

#### Microgrids are solving now

SERDP 2012 (Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program, July 10, 2012, “DoD Study Finds Microgrids Offer Improved Energy Security for DoD Installations,” http://serdp-estcp.org/News-and-Events/News-Announcements/Program-News/DoD-study-finds-microgrids-offer-improved-energy-security-for-DoD-installations)

Advanced microgrids offer a cost-effective solution to military installations' growing vulnerability to the fragile electric grid, according to a study released today by DoD’s Office of Installations and Environment. The study performed by MIT Lincoln Laboratory looked at different microgrid architectures and characteristics and compared their relative cost-effectiveness. The report provides insight into increasing energy security and reducing energy costs through the incorporation of renewable energy resources into microgrids, as well as new market opportunities for DoD in the area of demand response and ancillary services.¶ The study highlights the extent of ongoing microgrid work across DoD. It identified 44 installations that either had existing microgrids, planned installation of microgrids, or conducted microgrid studies or demonstrations at their facilities. The authors interviewed more than 75 people from the military Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Energy. The analysis categorized the ongoing microgrid efforts based on several key attributes including size, maturity, the inclusion of renewable resources, and the ability to operate in a grid-tied manner.¶ The analysis confirms the value of microgrids to DoD. The combination of on-site energy generation and storage, together with the microgrid’s ability to manage local energy supply and demand, allow installations to shed non-essential loads and maintain mission-critical loads if the electric grid is disrupted.

#### Their evidence is based on flawed models – unpredictable patchwork and robust protections to stop intentional blackouts.

Science Daily, 10-12-2010, “Why It's Hard to Crash the Electric Grid,” <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/10/101012121443.htm>

\*\*\*cites Seth Blumsack and Paul Hines, assistant professors in UVM's College of Engineering and Mathematical Sciences\*\*\*

Many topological models are, basically, graphs of connected links and nodes that represent the flows and paths within a system. When a node changes or fails, its nearest connected neighbor will often change or fail next. This abstraction has provided profound insights into many complex systems, like river networks, supply chains, and highway traffic. But electricity is strange and the US electric grid even stranger. In August of 2003 a blackout started in Ohio and then spread to New York City. Cleveland went down and soon Toronto was affected. The blackout was able to jump over long distances. "The way topological cascades typically occur -- is they're more like real dominoes," says Hines, an assistant professor in UVM's College of Engineering and Mathematical Sciences. "When you push a domino the only thing that can fall is the one next to it. Whereas in a power grid you might push one domino and the next one to fall might be a hundred miles away. "That's because, "when a transmission line fails -- instantly, at nearly the speed of light, everything changes. Everything that is connected will change just a little bit," Hines says, "But in ways that are hard to predict." This strangeness is compounded by the fact that the U.S. electric grid is more an intractable patchwork of history than a rational design. Which is why he and Blumsack decided to "run a horse race," he says, between topological models and a physics-based one -- applied to the actual arrangement of the North American Eastern Interconnect, the largest portion of the U.S. electric grid. Using real-world data from a 2005 North American Electric Reliability Corporation test case, they compared how vulnerable parts of the grid appeared in the differing models. The topological measures -- so-called "characteristic path lengths" and "connectivity loss" between nodes -- came up with dramatically different and less accurate results than a model that calculated blackout size driven by the two rules that most influence actual electric transmissions -- Ohm's and Kirchhoff's laws.In other words, the physics horse won. Or, as their paper concludes, "evaluating vulnerability in power networks using purely topological metrics can be misleading," and "results from physics-based models are more realistic and generally more useful for infrastructure risk assessment." Score one for gritty reality. The value of unpredictability An important implication of Hines's work, funded by the National Science Foundation, is that the electric grid is probably more secure that many people realize -- because it is so unpredictable. This, of course, makes it hard to improve its reliability (in another line of research, Hines has explored why the rate of blackouts in the United States hasn't improved in decades), but the up-side of this fact is that it would be hard for a terrorist to bring large parts of the grid down by attacking just one small part. "Our system is quite robust to small things failing -- which is very good," he says, "Even hurricanes have trouble taking out power systems. Hurricanes do cause power system failures, but they don't often take out the whole system."Blumsack agrees. "Our paper confirms that it would be possible for somebody who wanted to do something disruptive to the power grid to do so," he says. "A lot of the infrastructure is out in the open," which does create vulnerability to planned attack. "But if you wanted to black out half of the U.S., it will be much more difficult than some of these earlier models imply," he says. "If you were a bad guy, there is no obvious thing to do to take out the power system," Hines says. "What we learned from doing the simulations is that if you take out the biggest substation, with the most flow, you get the biggest failure on average. But there were also a number of cases where, even if you took out the biggest one, you don't get much of a blackout." "It takes an incredible amount of information," he says, "to really figure out how to make the grid fail."

#### Cyber-warfare is drastically exaggerated – no major attack has happened and 99 percent of hackers couldn’t inflict serious damage.

USIP (United States Institute for Peace) December 2004 “Cyberterrorism How Real Is the Threat?” Cyberterrorism

How Real Is the Threat?

Amid all the dire warnings and alarming statistics that the subject of cyberterrorism generates, it is important to remember one simple statistic: so far, there has been no recorded instance of a terrorist cyberattack on U.S. public facilities, transportation systems, nuclear power plants, power grids, or other key components of the national infrastructure. Cyberattacks are common, but they have not been conducted by terrorists and they have not sought to inflict the kind of damage that would qualify them as cyberterrorism. Technological expertise and use of the Internet do not constitute evidence of planning for a cyberattack. Joshua Green (“The Myth of Cyberterrorism,” Washington Monthly, November 2002) makes this point after reviewing the data retrieved from terrorists in Afghanistan: When U.S. troops recovered al Qaeda laptops in Afghanistan, officials were surprised to find its members more technologically adept than previously believed. They discovered structural and engineering software, electronic models of a dam, and information on computerized water systems, nuclear power plants, and U.S. and European stadiums. But nothing suggested they were planning cyberattacks, only that they were using the Internet to communicate and coordinate physical attacks. Neither al Qaeda nor any other terrorist organization appears to have tried to stage a serious cyberattack. For now, insiders or individual hackers are responsible for most attacks and intrusions and the hackers’ motives are not political. According to a report issued in 2002 by IBM Global Security Analysis Lab, 90 percent of hackers are amateurs with limited technical proficiency, 9 percent are more skilled at gaining unauthorized access but do not damage the files they read, and only 1 percent are highly skilled and intent on copying files or damaging programs and systems. Most hackers, it should be noted, try to expose security flaws in computer software, mainly in the operating systems produced by Microsoft. Their efforts in this direction have sometimes embarrassed corporations but have also been responsible for alerting the public and security professionals to serious security flaws. Moreover, although there are hackers with the ability to damage systems, disrupt e-commerce, and force websites offline, the vast majority of hackers do not have the necessary skills and knowledge. The ones who do, generally do not seek to wreak havoc. Douglas Thomas, a professor at the University of Southern California, spent seven years studying computer hackers in an effort to understand better who they are and what motivates them. Thomas interviewed hundreds of hackers and explored their “literature.” In testimony on July 24, 2002, before the House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, Thomas argued that “with the vast majority of hackers, I would say 99 percent of them, the risk [of cyberterrorism] is negligible for the simple reason that those hackers do not have the skill or ability to organize or execute an attack that would be anything more than a minor inconvenience.” His judgment was echoed in Assessing the Risks of Cyberterrorism, Cyber War, and Other Cyber Threats, a 2002 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, written by Jim Lewis, a sixteen-year veteran of the State and Commerce Departments. “The idea that hackers are going to bring the nation to its knees is too far-fetched a scenario to be taken seriously,” Lewis argued. “Nations are more robust than the early analysts of cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare give them credit for. Infrastructure systems [are] more flexible and responsive in restoring service than the early analysts realized, in part because they have to deal with failure on a routine basis.” Many computer security experts do not believe that it is possible to use the Internet to inflict death on a large scale. Some pointed out that the resilience of computer systems to attack is the result of significant investments of time, money, and expertise. As Green describes, nuclear weapons systems are protected by “air-gapping”: they are not connected to the Internet or to any open computer network and thus they cannot be accessed by intruders, terrorists, or hackers. Thus, for example, the Defense Department protects sensitive systems by isolating them from the Internet and even from the Pentagon’s own internal network. The CIA’s classified computers are also air-gapped, as is the FBI’s entire computer system.

#### No China/Taiwan war—Both sides will work to avoid war

Jisi 2005 (Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, China's Serch for Stability With America. Foreign Affairs. Sep/Oct 2005. http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84504/wang-jisi/china-s-search-for-stability-with-america.html)

Meanwhile, at a time when political relations between China and the United States are basically stable and economic and trade links are expanding, Taiwan remains a major source of unease. War between China and the United States over Taiwan would be a nightmare, and both sides will try hard to avoid it. Despite their differences, there is no reason the two sides should have to resort to force to resolve the matter. Yet some people in Taiwan, looking out for their own interests and supported by outsiders -- notably parts of the U.S. defense establishment and certain members of the U.S. Congress -- continue stubbornly to push for independence, ignoring the will of most Taiwanese. It is a mistake for Americans to support such separatists. If a clash occurs, these parties will be responsible.China views the status of Taiwan as an internal matter. But only by coordinating its U.S. policy with its policy toward Taiwan can Beijing curb the separatist forces on the island. Despite U.S. displeasure at China's passage of an antisecession law in March 2005, policymakers in Washington have reiterated their opposition to Taiwan's independence and viewed favorably the spring 2005 visits by Taiwanese opposition leaders to the mainland, which eased cross-strait relations. Nonetheless, Washington has now asked Beijing to talk directly to Taipei's ruling party and its leader, Chen Shui-bian. To improve matters, Chinese and U.S. government agencies and their foreign policy think tanks should launch a sustained and thorough dialogue on the issue and explore ways to prevent separatist forces from making a rash move, dragging both countries toward a confrontation neither wants.

### leadership adv

#### Nuclear power dying – Fukushima, natural gas, recession

Matthew L. Wald, “Nuclear Power’s Death Somewhat Exaggerated,” New York Times, April 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/11/business/energy-environment/nuclear-powers-death-somewhat-exaggerated.html, accessed 7-8-2012.

NUCLEAR energy is going through an odd patch. It refuses to die, but it does not prosper. This is how modest the nuclear industry’s prospects now look: Senator Lamar Alexander, a Tennessee Republican who has called for building 100 reactors in the next few years, told a conference of industry specialists in late March that the long-ballyhooed “nuclear renaissance” did not really exist anymore. Now, he said, it is an “awakening to the awareness of nuclear.” But it is an awakening with a price of $30 billion or more. Mr. Alexander was speaking to a conference convened on the 33rd anniversary of the Three Mile Island accident, a few weeks after the Nuclear Regulatory Commission gave permission to build a power reactor for the first time in more than 30 years, for the twin Vogtle reactors near Augusta, Ga. Those will cost $14 billion, if all goes well, and more if it does not. A few days after he spoke, the commission approved a license for another pair of reactors in South Carolina, which will cost about the same. Several other companies are laying out hundreds of millions of dollars in planning for reactors that may or may not get to the groundbreaking stage. The industry’s three great recent stumbling blocks, the Fukushima accident of March 2011, the exceptionally low price of natural gas and a recession that has stunted demand for power, mock the idea that dozens of new reactors are waiting in the wings. But in an era of worry over global warming, support is plentiful for at least keeping a toe in the water.

#### Proliferation risks are generally low unless nuclear energy and cooperation spread – this increases the risk by 500%

Matthew Fuhrmann, Stanton nuclear security fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, research focused on international security and nuclear proliferation, current work centers on the causes and consequences of the nuclear energy renaissance, research examines topics such as nuclear weapons and coercive threats, military strikes against nuclear facilities, radiological/nuclear terrorism, and regional nuclear weapons free zones, has been an assistant professor of political science at the University of South Carolina since January 2009, associate at the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard's Kennedy School, served as a research fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, was previously a research associate at the University of Georgia's Center for International Trade and Security, holds an MS in international affairs from Georgia Tech and a PhD in political science from the University of Georgia, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” International Security, Summer 2009, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/isec.2009.34.1.7, accessed 9-3-2012.

Before moving to the multivariate analysis, I considered cross tabulations of nuclear cooperation agreements against nuclear weapons program onset and nuclear weapons acquisition. The results are presented in tables 2 and 3. These simple cross tabulations underscore that proliferation is a relatively rare event. Decisions to begin weapons program occur in fifteen of the observations in the sample (0.22 percent), and bomb acquisition occurs in nine observations in the sample (0.13 percent). Even though proliferation occurs infrequently, these cross tabulations show that nuclear cooperation strongly influences whether countries will go down the nuclear path. Participation in at least one nuclear cooperation agreement increases the likelihood of beginning a bomb program by about 500 percent. The combination of militarized conflict and nuclear assistance has an even larger substantive effect on program onset. Experiencing both of these phenomenon increases the probability of initiating a weapons program by about 638 percent. This simple analysis emphasizes that these relationships are not deterministic. Although countries that receive peaceful assistance were more likely to begin weapons programs, the majority of countries that benefit from such aid do not proliferate. It is also noteworthy that 80 percent of the countries that began programs did so after receiving civilian aid. The four countries that initiated nuclear weapon programs without receiving such assistance—France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—did so in the 1940s and early 1950s when peaceful nuclear cooperation was not an option. From 1955 to 2000, no country began a nuclear weapons program without first receiving civilian assistance. This suggests that after the early days of the atomic age, nuclear aid became a necessary condition for launching a nuclear weapons program.

#### No cascade of proliferation – it’s all alarmist rhetoric.

Muthia Alagappa, pub. date: 2008, Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center, “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia,” accesed: 1-6-09, p. 521-2, Google Books

It will be useful at this juncture to address more directly the set of instability arguments advanced by certain policy makers and scholars: the domino effect of new nuclear weapon states, the probability of preventative action against new nuclear weapon states, and the compulsion of these states to use their small arsenals early for fear of losing them in a preventive or preemptive strike by a stronger nuclear adversary. On the domino effect, India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programs have not fueled new programs in South Asia or beyond. Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons is not a reaction to the Indian or Pakistani programs. It is grounded in that country’s security concerns about the U ntied States and Tehran’s regional aspirations. The North Korean test has evoked mixed reactions in Northeast Asia. Tokyo is certainly concerned; its reaction, though, has not been to initiate its own nuclear weapon program but to reaffirm and strengthen the American extended deterrence commitment to Japan. Even if the U.S.-Japan security treaty were to weaken, it is not certain that Japan would embark on a nuclear weapon program. Likewise, South Korea has sought reaffirmation of the American extended deterrence commitment, but has firmly held to its nonnuclear posture. Without dramatic change in it’s political, economic, and security circumstances, South Korea is highly unlikely to embark on a covert (or overt) nuclear weapon program as it did in the 1970s. South Korea could still become a nuclear weapon state by inheriting the nuclear weapons of North Korea should the Kim Jong Il regime collapse. Whether it retains or gives up that capability will hinge on the security circumstances of a unified Korea. The North Korean nuclear test has not spurred Taiwan or Mongolia to develop nuclear weapon capability. The point is that each country’s decision to embark on and sustain nuclear weapon programs is contingent on its particular security and other circumstances. Through appealing, the domino theory is not predictive; often it is employed to justify policy on the basis of alarmist predictions. The loss of South Vietnam, for example, did not lead to the predicted domino effect in Southeast Asia and brought about a fundamental transformation in that sub region (Lord 1993, 1996). In the nuclear arena, the nuclear programs of China, India, and Pakistan were part of a security chain reaction, not mechanically falling dominos. However, as observed earlier the Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean nuclear tests have thus far not had the domino effect predicted by alarmist analysts and policy makers. Great caution should be exercised in accepting at face value the sensational predictions of individuals who have a vested interest in accentuating the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Such analysts are now focused on the dangers of a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran may or may not have destabilizing effects. Such claims must be assessed on the basis of an objective reading of the drivers of national and regional security in Iran and the Middle East.

#### Science diplomacy fails to stop conflict.

David Dickson Director, SciDev.Net 4 June 2009 The limits of science diplomacy http://www.scidev.net/en/editorials/the-limits-of-science-diplomacy.html

The truth is that science and politics make an uneasy alliance. Both need the other. Politicians need science to achieve their goals, whether social, economic or — unfortunately — military; scientists need political support to fund their research. But they also occupy different universes. Politics is, at root, about exercising power by one means or another. Science is — or should be — about pursuing robust knowledge that can be put to useful purposes. A strategy for promoting science diplomacy that respects these differences deserves support. Particularly so if it focuses on ways to leverage political and financial backing for science's more humanitarian goals, such as tackling climate change or reducing world poverty. But a commitment to science diplomacy that ignores the differences — acting for example as if science can substitute politics (or perhaps more worryingly, vice versa), is dangerous. The Obama administration's commitment to "soft power" is already faltering. It faces challenges ranging from North Korea's nuclear weapons test to domestic opposition to limits on oil consumption. A taste of reality may be no bad thing.

#### The U.S. uses soft power to insure international arms sales.

Lora Lumpe & Jeff Donarski, 2005, Researcher and campaigner working on issues relating to military aid, the weapons trade and human rights - Council on Foreign Relations & Project associate, “The Arms Trade Revealed: A guide for investigators and activists,” <http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/handbook/AboutthisBook.html>

For a short while in 1991-92, it looked like things might change. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had graphically demonstrated the dangers of a laissez-faire approach to surplus arms production and trading. Iraq had amassed one of the largest arsenals in the world from arms exporters in the East and West, and the subsequent war sparked more questioning of the legitimacy of the international arms trade than had been heard in decades. Editorial pages in papers across America-as well as in France, Russia, Britain and elsewhere-criticized the role that national governments had played in arming Saddam Hussein. Politicians in legislatures around the world spoke out against the dangers of commercially-driven, routine and secretive arms sales. And individual citizens and policy/activist organizations in many countries-including in the USA-began campaigning against the lethal trade. Unfortunately, in the seven years since the Persian Gulf War (and the cold war) ended, the US government and other major arms exporting governments have apparently decided that no fundamental re-evaluation of the role of military force in international relations is advisable. Instead of placing greater emphasis on the rule of law and non-military diplomacy during the past decade, the United States and other key military powers have increased their reliance on military force through UN operations and/or regional alliances. Multilateral military operations, and the need for interoperable fighting forces, now provide one of the principal justifications for arms exporting and military training-by the United States in particular. Leaders in America and in the other major arms exporting states have apparently decided that they can manage crises that erupt as a result of excess arms production and exporting (including diplomatic tensions among themselves, wars among importers, massive refugee flows and financial insolvency) better than they can manage the alternative. The alternative would involve challenging major arms corporations and labor unions by reining in domestic arms production; reducing reliance on arms trading as the principal diplomatic currency; and decreasing reliance on arms exports for perceived strategic gains. Since the arms producing governments have abdicated any medium- to long-term vision of alternative security, the public interest sector-comprising human rights, religious and other civic organizations and individual citizens-is left to challenge the interests of the large, powerful arms industry(see chapter 5) and much of the bureaucracy at the State, Commerce and Defense Departments (see chapter 3).

#### That undermines hard power, encourages proliferation, and leads to regional conflict.

Lucien J. Dhooge, 1999, Assistant Professor of Business Law @ the University of the Pacific, Holds a LL.M. in International and Comparative Law from Georgetown, and is a Member of the Colorado and District of Columbia Bars, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law , "We Arm the World: The Implications of American Participation in the Global Armaments Trade,” Lexis Nexis

There are numerous risks associated with these practices. Such transactions contribute to the creation of greater stockpiles of weaponry and weapons production capacity and substitute military production activities for more beneficial activities in foreign labor markets. 248 In turn, the enhanced capacity of foreign countries to produce weapons diverts domestic jobs overseas in the short run and creates potential future competition in the long run. 249 These transfers also encourage other arms exporters to introduce advanced weaponry and technology into the international marketplace. 250 The transfers further encourage proliferation and disrupt regional stability by motivating governments unfriendly to U.S. military recipients to seek countervailing weaponry and technology. 251 Some of these transfers may also disrupt regional stability by creating or enhancing the capacity of states to develop and utilize weapons of mass destruction. 252 Furthermore, as the lethality of the armaments subject to export grows, these weapons may impair U.S. foreign policy and national security [\*610] interests by "significantly altering military balances, disrupting U.S. military operations and causing significant U.S. casualties."

#### No impact – status quo retrenchment sufficiently solves all global flashpoints – history overwhelmingly proves.

Joseph M. Parent (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami) and Paul K. MacDonald (Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College) November/December 2011 “The Wisdom of Retrenchment” Foreign Affairs <http://www.ihavenet.com/World-United-States-The-Wisdom-of-Retrenchment-America-Must-Cut-Back-to-Move-Forward-Foreign-Affairs.html>

Despite the erosion of U.S. military and economic dominance, many observers warn that a rapid departure from the current approach to foreign policy would be disastrous. The historian Robert Kagan cautions that "a reduction in defense spending . . . would unnerve American allies and undercut efforts to gain greater cooperation." The journalist Robert Kaplan even more apocalyptically warns that "lessening [the United States'] engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity." But these defenders of the status quo confuse retrenchment with appeasement or isolationism. A prudent reduction of the United States' overseas commitments would not prevent the country from countering dangerous threats and engaging with friends and allies. Indeed, such reductions would grant the country greater strategic flexibility and free resources to promote long-term growth. A somewhat more compelling concern raised by opponents of retrenchment is that the policy might undermine deterrence. Reducing the defense budget or repositioning forces would make the United States look weak and embolden upstarts, they argue. "The very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies," Kaplan worries. This anxiety is rooted in the assumption that the best barrier to adventurism by adversaries is forward defenses -- the deployment of military assets in large bases near enemy borders, which serve as tripwires or, to some eyes, a Great Wall of America. There are many problems with this position. For starters, the policies that have gotten the United States in trouble in recent years have been activist, not passive or defensive. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq alienated important U.S. allies, such as Germany and Turkey, and increased Iran's regional power. NATO's expansion eastward has strained the alliance and intensified Russia's ambitions in Georgia and Ukraine. More generally, U.S. forward deployments are no longer the main barrier to great-power land grabs. Taking and holding territory is more expensive than it once was, and great powers have little incentive or interest in expanding further. The United States' chief allies have developed the wherewithal to defend their territorial boundaries and deter restive neighbors. Of course, retrenchment might tempt reckless rivals to pursue unexpected or incautious policies, as states sometimes do. Should that occur, however, U.S. superiority in conventional arms and its power-projection capabilities would assure the option of quick U.S. intervention. Outcomes of that sort would be costly, but the risks of retrenchment must be compared to the risks of the status quo. In difficult financial circumstances, the United States must prioritize. The biggest menace to a superpower is not the possibility of belated entry into a regional crisis; it is the temptation of imperial overstretch. That is exactly the trap into which opponents of the United States, such as al Qaeda, want it to fall. Nor is there good evidence that reducing Washington's overseas commitments would lead friends and rivals to question its credibility. Despite some glum prophecies, the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from western Europe after the Cold War neither doomed NATO nor discredited the United States. Similar reductions in U.S. military forces and the forces' repositioning in South Korea have improved the sometimes tense relationship between Washington and Seoul. Calls for Japan to assume a greater defense burden have likewise resulted in deeper integration of U.S. and Japanese forces. Faith in forward defenses is a holdover from the Cold War, rooted in visions of implacable adversaries and falling dominoes. It is ill suited to contemporary world politics, where balancing coalitions are notably absent and ideological disputes remarkably mild. Others warn that the U.S. political system is too fragmented to implement a coordinated policy of retrenchment. In this view, even if the foreign policy community unanimously subscribed to this strategy, it would be unable to outmaneuver lobbying groups and bureaucracies that favor a more activist approach. Electoral pressures reward lucrative defense contracts and chest-thumping stump speeches rather than sober appraisals of declining fortunes. Whatever leaders' preferences are, bureaucratic pressures promote conservative decisions, policy inertia, and big budgets -- none of which is likely to usher in an era of self-restraint. Despite deep partisan divides, however, Republicans and Democrats have often put aside their differences when it comes to foreign policy. After World War II, the United States did not revert to the isolationism of earlier periods: both parties backed massive programs to contain the Soviet Union. During the tempestuous 1960s, a consensus emerged in favor of détente with the Soviets. The 9/11 attacks generated bipartisan support for action against al Qaeda and its allies. Then, in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, politicians across the spectrum recognized the need to bring the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to an end. When faced with pressing foreign policy challenges, U.S. politicians generally transcend ideological divides and forge common policies, sometimes expanding the United States' global commitments and sometimes contracting them. Today, electoral pressures support a more modest approach to foreign affairs. According to a 2009 study by the Pew Research Center, 70 percent of Americans would rather the United States share global leadership than go it alone. And a 2010 study by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 79 percent of them thought the United States played the role of world policeman more than it should. Even on sacrosanct issues such as the defense budget, the public has demonstrated a willingness to consider reductions. In a 2010 study conducted by the Program for Public Consultation at the University of Maryland, 64 percent of respondents endorsed reductions in defense spending, supporting an average cut of $109 billion to the base-line defense budget. Institutional barriers to reform do remain. Yet when presidents have led, the bureaucrats have largely followed. Three successive administrations, beginning with that of Ronald Reagan, were able to tame congressional opposition and push through an ambitious realignment program that ultimately resulted in the closure of 100 military bases, saving $57 billion. In its 2010 defense budget, the Obama administration succeeded in canceling plans to acquire additional F-22 Raptors despite fierce resistance by lobbyists, members of Congress, and the air force brass. The 2010 budget also included cuts to the navy's fleet of stealth destroyers and various components of the army's next generation of manned ground vehicles. Thus, claims that retrenchment is politically impractical or improbable are unfounded. Just as a more humble foreign policy will invite neither instability nor decline, domestic political factors will not inevitably prevent timely reform. To chart a new course, U.S. policymakers need only possess foresight and will. THE VIRTUES OF RESTRAINT Even if a policy of retrenchment were possible to implement, would it work? The historical record suggests it would. Since 1870, there have been 18 cases in which a great power slipped in the rankings, as measured by its GDP relative to those of other great powers. Fifteen of those declining powers implemented some form of retrenchment. Far from inviting aggression, this policy resulted in those states' being more likely to avoid militarized disputes and to recover their former rank than the three declining great powers that did not adopt retrenchment: France in the 1880s, Germany in the 1930s, and Japan in the 1990s. Those states never recovered their former positions, unlike almost half of the 15 states that did retrench, including, for example, Russia in the 1880s and the United Kingdom in the first decade of the twentieth century. Retrenchment works in several ways. One is by shifting commitments and resources from peripheral to core interests and preserving investments in the most valuable geographic and functional areas. This can help pare back the number of potential flashpoints with emerging adversaries by decreasing the odds of accidental clashes, as well as reducing the incentives of regional powers to respond confrontationally. Whereas primacy forces a state to defend a vast and brittle perimeter, a policy of retrenchment allows it to respond to significant threats at the times and in the places of its choosing. Conflict does not become entirely elective, as threats to core interests still must be met. But for the United States, retrenchment would reduce the overall burden of defense, as well as the danger of becoming bogged down in a marginal morass. It would also encourage U.S. allies to assume more responsibility for collective security. Such burden sharing would be more equitable for U.S. taxpayers, who today shoulder a disproportionate load in securing the world. Every year, according to Christopher Preble of the Cato Institute, they pay an average of $2,065 each in taxes to cover the cost of national defense, compared with $1,000 for Britons, $430 for Germans, and $340 for Japanese. Despite spending far less on defense, the United States' traditional allies have little trouble protecting their vital interests. No state credibly threatens the territorial integrity of either western European countries or Japan, and U.S. allies do not need independent power- projection capabilities to protect their homelands. NATO's intervention in Libya has been flawed in many respects, but it has demonstrated that European member states are capable of conducting complex military operations with the United States playing a secondary role. Going forward, U.S. retrenchment would compel U.S. allies to improve their existing capabilities and bear the costs of their altruistic impulses. The United States and its allies have basically the same goals: democracy, stability, and trade. But the United States is in the awkward position of both being spread too thin around the globe and irritating many states by its presence on, or near, their soil. Delegating some of its responsibilities to allies would permit the U.S. government to focus more on critical objectives, such as ensuring a stable and prosperous economy. Regional partners, who have a greater stake in and knowledge of local challenges, can take on more responsibility. With increased input from others and a less invasive presence, retrenchment would also allow the United States to restore some luster to its leadership.

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#### Faster, more creative, better for the environment – cooperation

EPA, “Policy on Alternative Dispute Resolution,” Federal Register, December 18, 2000, <http://www.pubklaw.com/hi/65fr81858.html>, accessed 9-10-2012.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or the Agency) ¶ strongly supports the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to ¶ deal with disputes and potential conflicts. ADR refers to voluntary ¶ techniques for preventing and resolving conflict with the help of ¶ neutral third parties. Experience within this Agency and elsewhere ¶ shows that ADR techniques for preventing and resolving conflicts can ¶ have many benefits including:¶ Faster resolution of issues;¶ More creative, satisfying and enduring solutions;¶ Reduced transaction costs;¶ Fostering a culture of respect and trust among EPA, its ¶ stakeholders, and its employees;¶ Improved working relationships;¶ [[Page 81859]]¶ Increased likelihood of compliance with environmental laws ¶ and regulation;¶ Broader stakeholder support for agency programs; and¶ Better environmental outcomes.¶ ADR techniques can be effective in both internal Agency ¶ disagreements and external conflicts. ADR allows the Agency to have a ¶ more productive work environment and to work better with State, Tribal, ¶ and local governments, the regulated community, environmental and ¶ public health organizations, and the public. This policy is intended to ¶ be flexible enough to respond to the full range of disputes EPA faces, ¶ and to achieve these objectives:¶ Promote understanding of ADR techniques;¶ Encourage routine consideration of ADR approaches to ¶ anticipate, prevent, and resolve disputes;¶ Increase the use of ADR in EPA business;¶ Highlight the importance of addressing confidentiality ¶ concerns in ADR processes;¶ Promote systematic evaluation and reporting on ADR at EPA; ¶ and¶ Further the Agency's overall mission through ADR program ¶ development.¶ What does EPA mean by the term ``ADR'?¶ EPA adopts the definition of ADR in the Administrative Dispute ¶ Resolution Act of 1996 (ADRA): ``any procedure that is used to resolve ¶ issues in controversy, including but not limited to, conciliation, ¶ facilitation, mediation, fact finding, minitrials, arbitration, and use ¶ of ombuds, or any combination thereof.'' 5 U.S.C. 571(3). All these ¶ techniques involve a neutral third party. Depending on the ¶ circumstances of a particular dispute, neutrals may be Agency employees ¶ or may come from outside EPA. Typically, all aspects of ADR are ¶ voluntary, including the decision to participate, the type of process ¶ used, and the content of any final agreement.¶ In what types of situations does EPA encourage the use of ADR?¶ EPA encourages the use of ADR techniques to prevent and resolve ¶ disputes with external parties in many contexts, including ¶ adjudications, rulemaking, policy development, administrative and civil ¶ judicial enforcement actions, permit issuance, protests of contract ¶ awards, administration of contracts and grants, stakeholder ¶ involvement, negotiations, and litigation. In addition, EPA encourages ¶ the use of ADR techniques to prevent and resolve internal disputes such ¶ as workplace grievances and equal employment opportunity complaints, ¶ and to improve labor-management partnerships.¶ While ADR may be appropriate in any of these contexts, the decision ¶ to use an ADR technique in a particular matter must reflect an ¶ assessment of the specific parties, issues, and other factors. ¶ Considerations relevant to the appropriateness of ADR for any ¶ particular matter include, at a minimum, the guidelines in section 572 ¶ of the ADRA and any applicable Agency guidance on particular ADR ¶ techniques or ADR use in specific types of disputes. ADR program staff ¶ at EPA headquarters and in the Regions can help the parties assess ¶ whether and which form of ADR should be used in a particular matter.

#### Better policy – information sharing

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Negotiation should hardly be viewed as a panacea for the various difficulties that typically confront the policymaker. Used in the right context, however, negotiation can be a useful tool in the establishment, implementation, and enforcement of environmental and occupational safety and health policy. Negotiation can facilitate a better understanding of issues, concerns, facts, and positions among adversaries. It can also promote the sharing of relevant information, and can provide an opportunity for creative problem-solving. Whether negotiation will be better than other, generally more adversarial mechanisms as a means of fostering improved environmental, health, and safety outcomes, or of stimulating meaningful technological change, will depend on the situation in which it is used. In general, negotiation would appear to work best a means of securing these goals in situations in which the necessary regulatory signals for improvement and innovation are already in place.¶ This is one of the reasons that EPA's use of negotiated compliance, as embodied in its SEP policy, has been as successful as it has been. To the firm that is the target of the enforcement action, the "stakes" are clear: so long as it believes it faces higher costs (in the form of a larger fine and/or higher transaction costs) if it does not identify and execute a SEP that is acceptable to EPA, the firm has a meaningful incentive to participate in good faith in the SEP process. And, because the agency has structured the program to allow maximum credit for pollution prevention projects, pollution prevention can become the focus, and the goal, of the negotiations. The pollution prevention results of the SEP program have been relatively modest - mostly diffusion and, sometimes, incremental innovation - but this is in keeping with the relatively modest nature of the financial incentives typically involved, and with the relatively short time period within which the SEP typically must be identified and completed. Especially because negotiation is the traditional means of resolving enforcement disputes, even outside of the SEP process, negotiation appears to work well here. ¶ One would also expect negotiation to work well in those negotiated implementation situations that have a clear, formal focus on technological change, such as the innovation waiver opportunities created by certain environmental statutes. The chief signal to innovate - the new regulatory standard - is already in place (or clearly on the horizon) before negotiation over the waiver or variance begins, and the statutes typically provide an extended period of time for the firm to develop and test the proposed innovation. Thus, so long as the new standard is stringent enough to command the firm's attention, firms should have a meaningful incentive to negotiate time to pursue an innovative compliance alternative.

#### Avoids plan’s litigation, guarantees no roll-back

CNA, Center for Negotiation Analysis, not-for-profit research institute established in 1993 devoted to studying, training, and providingg practical advisory support concerning negotiations, mediation, and other forms of conflict resolution at the national, regional and international levels, “Regulatory Negotiations,” February 1, 2004, <http://www.negotiations.org/reg-neg1.htm>, accessed 9-12-2012.

The traditional process of regulatory development is typically top-down. Government initiates, formulates and proposes the rules. In centralized or closed systems, regulations are imposed; in more open systems, businesses, groups or individuals may comment on the proposals in public hearings, but with little possibility of making major structural and functional modifications to the regulations. This process, while well-intentioned, often leaves stakeholders feeling far removed from the process and disempowered. They may feel that they have minimal voice in designing the regulations, standards and provisions that must be obeyed, and, as a result, compliance may be low and enforcement costs high -- a double-edged sword.¶ Stakeholder reactions to top-down regulatory development can have negative implications. If penalties are increased to discourage noncompliance, businesses may migrate into a "shadow economy," thereby fueling corruption, reducing tax revenues and evading the regulatory regime altogether. In some societies, lengthy and costly litigation in the courts is sometimes pursued by civil society groups to modify or eliminate imposed regulations. Antagonistic and adversarial relations between regulatory agencies and the regulated parties may ensue, resulting in delay or outright disregard for the regulation’s intent. The lack of effective and frank dialogue between the regulators and the regulated is usually blamed for these negative consequences.¶ There is an alternative approach to the traditional process of regulatory formulation and implementation – negotiated rulemaking or regulatory negotiation (reg-neg). Negotiated rulemaking brings together affected stakeholder groups -- businesses, organizations, and citizens -- with the relevant government agency and a neutral mediator or facilitator to build a consensus on the features of a new regulation before it is proposed officially by the agency. Regulatory provisions are developed as a bottom-up participatory process of negotiation.¶ Negotiated rulemaking is a fully collaborative process, in which all interested groups are convened in an "Advisory Committee." Key issues and concerns are identified, the interests of all sides are compared and contrasted, negotiations take place, and hopefully, agreements based on consensus are developed.¶ In the United States, negotiated rulemaking became an officially recommended approach to develop new regulations by federal government agencies in 1990 when the Negotiated Rulemaking Act (5 U.S.C. 561-570) was passed by Congress. A September 1993 Executive Order from the White House requires all federal agencies to consider applying negotiated rulemaking strategies in future regulatory actions. However, the approach has been used informally by government agencies since the 1970s. The Department of Labor, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of the Interior, are its principal proponents. By far, the EPA has been the most frequent user of negotiated rulemaking. Over 50 federal negotiated rulemaking cases have been documented between 1982 and 1995; many more applications have been conducted in the United States at the state level . Examples of environmental regulations developed using negotiated rulemaking in the United States include:¶ Penalties for businesses for noncompliance with the Clean Air Act¶ Exceptions for licensing pesticides¶ Performance standards for wood burning stoves¶ Controls on volatile organic chemical equipment leaks¶ Standards for transporting hazardous wastes¶ Standards for chemicals used in manufacturing wood furniture.¶ The experience with negotiated rulemaking in the United States has produced several benefits:¶ While negotiated rulemaking takes more time and effort upfront than traditional modes of developing regulations, all the stakeholders, including government agencies, are more satisfied with the results. ¶ Participants find that with a negotiated process, the resulting regulations tend not to be challenged in court. (In contrast, about 80 percent of all EPA regulations have been challenged in court and about 30 percent have been changed as a result.)¶ Less time, money and effort are expended on enforcing the regulations.¶ Final regulations are technically more accurate and clear to everyone.¶ Final regulations can be implemented earlier and with a higher compliance rate.¶ More cooperative relationships are established between the agency and the regulated parties.

#### Reg negs guarantee regulatory certainty for the industry – the regulated participates

J. Walton Blackburn, and Willa Marie Bruce, “Mediating Environmental Conflicts,” 1995, pg 213., accessed 9-10-2012.

Regulatory outcome. A primary benefit of Reg-Neg for EPA is that the rule it is¶ required by law to promulgate actually gets developed and promulgated, often¶ with little or no litigation by industrial or environmental groups. At times, the¶ agency has experienced early implementation and compliance with the regulation.¶ This is because the regulated community, state and environmental interests have¶ been involved in the process all along and know what the contents and requirements of the rule will be. Most parties agree that a rule developed under Reg-Neg¶ is better than a rule that EPA develops in the traditional manner, because more of¶ the affected parties are involved, allowing more issues to be addressed.¶ Participants from state agencies and environmental groups see regulatory benefits as well. Often, state and environmental groups’ primary interests are to have a¶ rule in place that mandates specific requirements for the reduction of a variety of¶ pollutants. With a successful Reg-Neg, such a rule is developed. Often the Reg¶ Neg rule is more readily implemented and enforced than a traditionally developed¶ rule, which may be litigated for years. Thus, the environmental benefits of specific¶ pollution reduction goals are achieved on schedule and sometimes much earlier.¶ Finally, the regulated community experiences benefits from Reg-Neg as well.¶ By participating in Reg-Neg, it is able to transmit and analyze critical data upon¶ which regulatory decisions will be made. Participation allows the regulated community to have input into the design of the final regulation, which gives it certainty¶ regarding what the regulation will require. This certainty often results in earlier¶ and more consistent implementation and enforcement of the final rule.

#### Reg negs reduce the controversy associated with polarizing policy issues

Philip J. Harter, served as the Director of the Program on Consensus, Democracy and Governance at Vermont Law School which was funded by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation to explore democratic approaches to increasing the role of the private sector in making decisions with public implications, as a member of the Honors Program of the US Department of Transportation and then practiced law with the firm of Shea & Gardner in Washington, DC. He served as senior staff attorney for the Administrative Conference of the United States from 1975 to 1977; in 1976 he was co-chair of President Ford's Task Force on the Revision of OSHA Safety Standards, “Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking,” December 1999, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=202808>, accessed 9-10-2012.

Recent Agency Use of Reg Neg. And, indeed, in the past few years¶ agencies have used reg neg to develop some of their most contentious rules. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Park Service used a variant of the process to write the regulations and policies governing sightseeing flights over national parks;¶ the issue had been sufficiently controversial that the President had to intervene and direct the two agencies to develop rules “for the management of sightseeing aircraft in the National Parks where it is deemed necessary to reduce or prevent the adverse effects of suchaircraft.”22¶ The Department of Transportation used it to write a regulation governing the delivery of propane and other compressed gases when the regulation became ensnared in litigation and Congressional action¶ .23 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration used it to address the erection of steel structures, an issue that had been on its docket for more than a decade with two abortive attempts at rulemaking when OSHA turned to reg neg.24 The Forest Service has just published a notice of intent to establish a reg neg committee to develop policies governing the use of fixed anchors for rock climbing in designated wilderness areas administered by the Forest Service.25 This issue has become extremelycontroversial.26¶ Negotiated rulemaking has proven enormously successful in developing agreements in highly polarized situations and has enabled the parties to address the best, most effective or efficient way of solving a regulatory controversy. Agencies have therefore turned to it to help resolve particularly difficult, contentious issues that have eluded closure by means of traditional rulemaking procedures.¶ 5

#### Avoids communities… reg negs can transform public disdain to active public support

Matthew Lindstrom and Martin Nie, ¶ Research Consultants, “HOW DO YOU COLLECT AND ¶ USE PUBLIC INFORMATION IN ¶ THE DEVELOPMENT OF ¶ TRANSPORTATION PLANS AND ¶ PROGRAMS?,” AZ Department of Transportation, March 1997, <http://www.azdot.gov/TPD/ATRC/publications/project_reports/PDF/AZ452.pdf>, accessed 9-10-2012.

To achieve improved public participation and acceptance of plans and projects an agency ¶ must first want to improve public participation. It seems clear -- through the focus groups, ¶ telephone interviews, and mail surveys that acceptance of plans and projects is directly related to ¶ improved and effective public participation. Citizen support and approval is a common goal ¶ sought by agencies, but agencies rarely enjoy these benefits if they continually ignore, silence, or ¶ try to placate the public. By building a mutually cooperative relationship with the diverse array of ¶ citizens, an agency’s plans and programs will be well known and more likely accepted because ¶ citizens and groups will have helped design them from the outset. Through an active and diverse ¶ communication process with the public, there will be less community polarization, more ¶ information and feedback for both the agency and public, and as a result, more policies that are ¶ not just passively accepted, but actively supported by the public.

#### Can’t do both – reg negs are an alternative to notice-and-comment – perm undercuts potential of reg neg

Sara Pirk, J.D., University of Oregon School of Law, 2002, Environmental and Natural Resources Law Certiﬁcate; B.A., University¶ of Minnesota, Twin Cities, International Relations (Environmental Policy focus) and Political Science, 1999, “Expanding Public Participation in Environmental Justice: Methods, Legislation, Litigation and Beyond,” University of Oregon¶ Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation, Spring 2002, <http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/iilpp/EnvironmentalRoundtableResearchDocs/Pirk%20-%20Expanding.pdf>, accessed 9-10-2012.

Regulatory negotiation is an alternative to notice and comment participation and was developed to form dialogue among¶ regulators, regulated parties, and interested parties. n33 It is used in rule--making and is considered an efﬁcient way¶ to form rules with which everyone can live. n34 Regulatory negotiation is also considered a good method of public¶ participation because it produces better results. Through negotiation over rules in a small forum, the groups involved are¶ more likely to cooperate and problem--solve rather than take sides and defend their positions. n35¶ Regulatory negotiation gives parties involved in following and enacting rules, as well as interest groups, a chance to¶ directly participate in formulating rules that they will have to follow. n36 This differs from notice and comment public¶ participation where only the enacting agency makes the rules and then announces them to other parties who never had the¶ chance to inﬂuence the decision making process when it counted. By having all the parties work together on the rules,¶ working relationships are formed that can be beneﬁcial in the future. The parties, including agencies such as the EPA, are¶ more satisﬁed because they have a direct role in rule—making.

#### Any deviation from a strictly reg neg approach means parties lose interest and negotiations fail

Herbert J. Martin, partner in the law firm of Crowell & Moring. ¶ Washington. D.C ., and represents clients In energy and transportation ¶ Matters, holds B.A. and M.A. degrees from Fordham University ¶ and is a graduate of the Catholic University Law School in Washington. D.C., “Alternative Dispute Resolution: ¶ Coming to Proceedings Near You,” 1992, <http://ftp.resource.org/acus.gov/raw_scans/gov.acus.1992.alt.pdf>, accessed 9-10-2012.

The act also includes highly detailed provisions governing the use of binding arbitration in agency proceedings" ¶ The focus on arbitration and the level of detail devoted to ¶ it appears to be a function of the binding nature or this ¶ form of dispute resolution. The act allows the head of an ¶ agency to terminate an arbitration proceeding or vacate an ¶ arbitration award before it becomes final. If this power is ¶ exercised to vacate an award, parties may recover their ¶ attorney fees and expenses incurred in connection with the ¶ arbitration, unless the agency head determines that such ¶ recovery would be unjust. These provisions were inserted ¶ to satisfy the concerns of the Department of Justice that ¶ arbitration decisions binding the government would constitute an unlawful delegation of executive authority. The ¶ expectation is that this summary power will be exercised ¶ rarely: otherwise, parties will quickly lose faith in arbitrations involving the government. In fact, despite the focus ¶ on binding arbitration in the act, other nonbinding forms ¶ of dispute resolution may find greater favor in agency ¶ proceedings.

#### Resolved is a firm decision

The New Oxford American Dictionary 2005 "resolution n” , second edition. Ed. Erin McKean. Oxford University Press, 2005. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t183.e65284

a firm decision to do or not to do something: she kept her resolution not to see Anne any more a New Year's resolution

#### Should guarantees an action that occurs immediately

<http://www.catholicculture.org/commentary/otr.cfm?id=3113> unfit for priestly service Novus744 - Oct. 06, 2005

Actually, AbrahamT, most people don't even know what the word "should" means. It is, in actuality, the present tense of the word "shall". It denotes obligation. Meaning that if it says that someone SHOULD do something, it means that he has the OBLIGATION to do it.

#### Increase is a mandate

HEFC, “Memorandum from the Higher Education Funding Council for England (DCH 137),” Parliament, Higher Education Funding Council, September 2004, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtchar/167/167we98.htm>, accessed 10-5-2012.

The Draft Bill creates an obligation on the principal regulator to do all that it "reasonably can to meet the compliance objective in relation to the charity".[45] The Draft Bill defines the compliance objective as "to increase compliance by the charity trustees with their legal obligations in exercising control and management of the administration of the charity".[46] ¶ 9.2 Although the word "increase" is used in relation to the functions of a number of statutory bodies,[47] such examples demonstrate that "increase" is used in relation to considerations to be taken into account in the exercise of a function, rather than an objective in itself.¶ 9.3 HEFCE is concerned that an obligation on principal regulators to "increase" compliance per se is unworkable, in so far as it does not adequately define the limits or nature of the statutory duty. Indeed, the obligation could be considered to be ever-increasing.

#### Process focus is good for policy making – guarantees support

Philip J. Harter, professor of law at University of Missouri, “Collaboration: The Future of Governance,” Journal of Dispute Resolution, 2009, Lexis.

So much of the discussion of collaborative governance is at a high level of abstraction or philosophy. Before one can be serious about it, however, one needs to understand or at least examine a bit of plumbing: the details are important. Ironically, even those who are ardent supporters of collaboration often overlook the essential details. n41 But, as was urged early on, some important fixed points-nodes in the system-need to be addressed. Thus, before we can fully appreciate collaborative governance, we need to examine a bit of just how it is done.¶ Federal agencies are authorized to use alternative means of dispute resolution to resolve issues in controversy that relate to an administrative program. n42 The Negotiated Rulemaking Act (Act) makes this general authority explicit with respect to developing regulations via consensus among the interests that would be significantly affected by the rule. n43 The Act then sets out the procedures to be followed in negotiating a consensus on a proposed rule. n44 While the Act only addresses negotiating rules, n45 the same process can be used to develop other forms of policy. What follows is an elaboration on that process.¶ A. Purpose¶ In a negotiated rulemaking, representatives of the interests that will be significantly affected by the rule negotiate a consensus-an actual agreement-on a proposed rule or policy. The agency typically agrees to use the agreement as the basis for a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), and the private parties agree to support that proposal. The agency will also frequently express its intent to issue a final rule based on the notice and hence on the agreement. n46

### communities DA

#### Impacts previously underestimated

Science Daily, 11, 8-19-2011, “Biodiversity Critical for Maintaining Multiple 'Ecosystem Services'“, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/08/110819155422.htm

By combining data from 17 of the largest and longest-running biodiversity experiments, scientists from universities across North America and Europe have found that previous studies have underestimated the importance of biodiversity for maintaining multiple ecosystem services across many years and places. "Most previous studies considered only the number of species needed to provide one service under one set of environmental conditions," says Prof. Michel Loreau from McGill University's biology department who supervised the study. "These studies found that many species appeared redundant. That is, it appeared that the extinction of many species would not affect the functioning of the ecosystem because other species could compensate for their loss." Now, by looking at grassland plant species, investigators have found that most of the studied species were important at least once for the maintenance of ecosystem services, because different sets of species were important during different years, at different places, for different services, and under different global change (e.g., climate or land-use change) scenarios. Furthermore, the species needed to provide one service during multiple years were not the same as those needed to provide multiple services during one year. "This means that biodiversity is even more important for maintaining ecosystem services than was previously thought," says Dr. Forest Isbell, the lead author and investigator of this study. "Our results indicate that many species are needed to maintain ecosystem services at multiple times and places in a changing world, and that species are less redundant than was previously thought." The scientists involved in the study also offer recommendations for using these results to prioritize conservation efforts and predict consequences of species extinctions. "It is nice to know which groups of species promoted ecosystem functioning under hundreds of sets of environmental conditions," says Isbell, "because this will allow us to determine whether some species often provide ecosystem services under environmental conditions that are currently common, or under conditions that will become increasingly common in the future." But Michel Loreau, of McGill, adds au cautionary note: "We should be careful when making predictions. The uncertainty over future environmental changes means that conserving as much biodiversity as possible could be a good precautionary approach."

#### Reversibility

Cass R. Sunstein () 2007 “WORST-CASE SCENARIOS” p. 176-7, Harry Kalven Visitng Professor, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School but is currently on leave to serve as the Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Obama administration, and

In ordinary life, our judgments about worst-case scenarios have everything to do with irreversibility. Of course an action may be hard but not impossible to undo, and so there may be a continuum of cases, with different degrees of difficulty in reversing. A marriage can be reversed, but divorce is rarely easy; having a child is very close to irreversible; moving from New York to Paris is reversible, but moving back may be difficult. People often take steps to avoid courses of action that are burdensome rather than literally impossible to reverse. In this light,we might identify an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, applicable to a subset of risks.3 As a rough first approximation, the principle says this: Special steps should be taken to avoid irreversible harms, through precautions that go well beyond those that would be taken if irreversibility were not a problem. The general attitude here is “act, then learn,” as opposed to the tempting alternative of “wait and learn.” In the case of climate change, some people believe that research should be our first line of defense. In their view, we should refuse to commit substantial resources to the problem until evidence of serious harm is unmistakably clear.4 But even assuming that the evidence is not so clear, research without action allows greenhouse gas emissions to continue, which might produce risks that are irreversible, or at best difficult and expensive to reverse. For this reason, the best course of action might well be to take precautions now as a way of preserving flexibility for future generations. In the environmental context in general, this principle suggests that regulators should proceed with far more aggressive measures than would otherwise seem justified.5

#### Invisible tipping point

Science Daily, 11, 3-3-2011, “Loss of Plant Diversity Threatens Earth's Life-Support Systems, Experts Say”, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/03/110303153116.htm

Biodiversity loss in the real world Recognizing that their findings mostly rest on analysis of short-term experiments (generally a few days, weeks, or months) in relatively small settings, the researchers also attempted to determine how diversity effects "scale-up" to longer time scales, bigger areas, or both. The authors note that these are the real-world scales "at which species extinctions actually matter and at which conservation and management efforts take place." The team's findings suggest that scale does indeed matter, and that small laboratory and field experiments typically underestimate the effects of biodiversity loss. In the researchers' own words, "Data are generally consistent with the idea that the strength of diversity effects are stronger in experiments that run longer, and in experiments performed at larger spatial scales." Duffy is now further testing this scaling issue with a 3-year grant from the U.S. National Science Foundation. He is using the grant to establish a global experimental network for studying how nutrient pollution and changes in biodiversity impact seagrass beds. Study co-author Jarrett Byrnes, of the National Center for Ecological Analyses and Synthesis, says "Species extinction is happening now, and it's happening quickly. And unfortunately, our resources are limited. This means we're going to have to prioritize our conservation efforts, and to do that, scientists have to start providing concrete answers about the numbers and types of species that are needed to sustain human life. If we don't produce these estimates quickly, then we risk crossing a threshold that we can't come back from."

#### Issues of public perception comes first… DOD agrees

King 11

Marcus King, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy TeamLaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf

DoD will have to take the views of stakeholders such as state and local¶ governments into account when deciding whether to undertake, or¶ participate in a nuclear power project. Governmental views at these¶ levels vary considerably and may be shaped by public opinion.¶ Public opinion is solicited and taken into consideration at several¶ stages of the NRC licensing process. Although public views toward¶ nuclear power are increasingly favorable, there is significant opposition within some segments of the population. Before undertaking a¶ specific nuclear power project, it would be important for DoD to take¶ public opinion into account and consider it in the context of broader¶ military installation/community relations.

#### Public support key to hegemonic posture – enables intervention and credible threats – making the military burdensome to voters risks reversing this

van der Linden 9

Harry van der Linden Chapter 1 of Th. A. van Baarda D.E.M. Verweij (eds.), The Moral Dimension of

Asymmetrical Warfare (Leiden and Boston: Brill Academic

Publsihers/Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), pp. 31-46. Questioning the Resort to U.S. Hegemonic Military Force

http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1075&context=facsch\_papers

On the whole, American citizens have accepted the project of U.S. military hegemony. One factor that accounts for this is that the project holds out the promise of winning wars without a high loss of life among American soldiers. The Gulf War, the Kosovo campaign, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War in its initial stage give credibility to the view that the United States through superior warfare technology can defeat most conventional armies without a high number of American casualties. High-tech warfare even creates the perception that war itself has become almost bloodless, foremost a technological spectacle without the ripping apart of real human bodies. Smart and precise weapons, it appears, efficiently stamp out evil only and do not result in the carnage of earlier wars, especially among civilians.4 The perception is distorted, but the media (with its endless replay of video images of precise hits) and the Pentagon through its perception management programs (aiming at the removal of references to, and images of, the casualties of war) have made it a common perception. 5 War and military buildup have also become more acceptable to the American political mainstream, the middle- and upper-middle classes, because the military consists of volunteers, drawn disproportionately from lower-income families, and the material burden per capita of waging war and pursuing military superiority is modest due to the size of the U.S. economy.6 Even in recent years, which have seen rapid increases in American military spending, the military budget has remained under 5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Besides, U.S. military hegemony feeds a large military industry, providing the middle class with ample employment opportunities. The greatest losers in raised defense budgets tend to be the poor, but traditionally they also have had the least electoral impact. The overall result is that the resort to war has become considerably easier. (I will address in 1.4 whether the current war against Iraq in its nonconventional stage might have made Americans more averse to military intervention). Once war does not interfere greatly with the lives of most citizens, appears efficient in reducing evil in the world, and creates jobs, the political decision to resort to armed force has in practice a lower threshold. Indeed, more major U.S. military interventions have taken place since the end of the Cold War than during the more than forty years of this era itself.7

#### Triggers unique backlash in California

Paul Joskow, 2006 \* Elizabeth and James Kim an Professor of Economics al the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Director. MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/publications/workingpapers/2006-019.pdf

There are other potential institutional barriers to a significant growth in new ¶ nuclear capacity that need to be taken into account. First, the unsettled state of electricity ¶ sector restructuring and deregulation (Joskow 2006a) suggests to me that it is unlikely ¶ that we will see much if any investment in new nuclear capacity in states that have ¶ adopted competitive market models, at least until wholesale and retail market designs ¶ deal with design flaws that create general disincentives for investment in new generating ¶ capacity (Joskow 2006b). Moreover, stabilizing wholesale and retail market designs so¶ that investors can count on a clear, stable, and fair market environment will need to occur ¶ to support this type of investment. Second, potential investors in new nuclear plants will ¶ still have to deal with state and local regulatory authorities and potential resistance from ¶ anti-nuclear groups that have been quiet during the long hiatus in new nuclear plant ¶ construction. Historically, the greatest opposition to nuclear plants has been in the ¶ Northeast and the West Coast, especially California.¶ 19¶ Many of the states that have ¶ adopted competitive market models also happen to be located in these regions of the ¶ country

#### California bases key – asia and pacific focus, unique support structures and geographic features

SCLC, 12

(Southern California Leadership Council was founded in 2005 as a non-partisan, non-profit, business-led public policy partnership of business and community leaders. The Leadership Council exerts strong leadership on issues of regional significance, providing a common voice on major public policies critical to economic vitality, job growth and quality of life in Southern California. The Leadership Council unites business and community leaders from throughout the seven-county region into one effective leadership organization whose membership includes three former California Governors and two dozen Presidents and CEO’s of top Southern California companies, <http://socallc.org/business-retention-and-attraction-strategies-preserving-and-strengthening-californias-military-readiness-related-jobs-as-sequestration-brac-are-addressed/>)

California’s military installations are vital to our country’s national security, and military spending plays a critical role in providing more than one million jobs in California that fuel the economy.¶ An economic study, undertaken by the Southwest Defense Alliance, indicates that, for the study period covering 2005-09, an average of 1 million jobs per year were tied to national defense spending in California. Over that period, nearly $600 billion in increased economic output was generated plus $12 billion in cumulative state taxes.¶ There are more than 30 major defense installations in California, incorporating all military services — more than double that of any other state. And, California provides more recruits for the armed services than any other state.¶ Currently, two issues are looming that could hit our military and defense communities hard at a critical time when we cannot afford to lose jobs, revenue and military preparedness.¶ Sequestration Cuts¶ “Sequestration” requires the Pentagon to cut nearly $500 billion in military spending over the next decade if Congress does not reach agreement, by January 2013, on a plan to reduce the federal deficit by more than $1 trillion over that same time period. This automatic axe was included in the Budget Control Act of 2012 due to the failure of a Congressional super- committee to resolve the issue.¶ If Congress does not come together to develop a long-term budget compromise and the cut backs in military spending are triggered, California’s economy will be jolted, and the state’s military readiness will be impacted. Nationwide, California is expected to be the state most directly and severely affected by these cuts which places hundreds of thousands of high-wage, high-skilled aerospace and other defense-related and allied jobs at risk.¶ A recent George Mason University report, “The Economic Impact of the Budget Control Act of 2011 on DOD and Non-DOA Agencies”, estimates that California will lose more than 225,000 jobs tied to military defense in the first two fiscal years that the sequestration cuts occur.¶ The urgency of averting across-the-board sequestration cuts impacting the military and non-military sectors cannot be overstated. Uncertainty abounds. As to the military sector — per regulatory requirements, large defense contractors, facing the prospect of these cuts in three months, will soon have to issue layoff notices. And, small defense contractors – from the sole-proprietor electrician to the mom-and-pop technical services company – face the prospect of going out of business. Further, some experts have speculated that the Pentagon would need to spend millions of dollars to administer the red tape associated with canceling thousands of existing government contracts.¶ In a world in which the threat matrix is increasingly weighted toward Asia and the Pacific, California’s national security role is greater now than in the past. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has described sequestration as a “disaster”. “Congress must find a solution to avert this fiscal disaster,” Panetta said. “At some point they are going to have to find the strength and the will..to do the right thing.”¶ Military Base Realignment & Closure (BRAC)¶ In April, 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced it was seeking authorization from Congress to conduct two rounds of realignments and closures of military bases in the United States, one in 2013 and the other in 2015. Known as the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, this is part of a plan to trim $487 billion from defense spending in the next decade.¶ Congress has not yet acted on the proposed authorization and will likely not do so until after the Presidential election (November 2012). Although the DOD initially requested two rounds of BRAC, Secretary Panetta indicated recently that the proposed 2013 round of BRAC will not be conducted, and, instead, the department plans to focus on drawing down military installations overseas. Pentagon watchers believe that the request for the 2015 round will remain intact.¶ The Process: The authorization calls for the appointment of a new, nine-member BRAC Commission, appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate, which will make consolidation and closure recommendations to the President. Once a BRAC commission is constituted, DOD would launch a wide ranging review of its infrastructure — evaluating installations on their military value; determining the potential for savings in the event of a closure or realignment; gauging the economic impact on existing communities; considering the environmental impact of a closure; and ascertaining the ability of other bases to accommodate additional equipment and personnel. Upon completion of this evaluation, DOD would release its list of proposed closures and realignments which the commission would then review and consider before submitting its final report and recommendations. If the President approves of the commission’s work, Congress would have a grace period to vote disapproval. For more details, click on the link to the DOD BRAC Proposal for 2013 and 2015:¶ http://www.ausn.org/Community/Blogs/tabid/2167/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/15788/Department-of-Defense-Announces-37-Page-Plan-for-2013-and-2015-BRAC-Rounds.aspx¶ Pentagon officials view the BRAC process as key to shedding excess military infrastructure and directing limited defense dollars to higher spending priorities.¶ In past rounds, 1988 through 1995, California suffered approximately 30% of the total base closures and realignments in the nation and 50% of the nation’s base-closure related employment losses — a dramatically disproportionate burden. During the last BRAC round in 2005, California came out well, experiencing no base closures, although some realignments were ordered. This result was due to the tenacity of members of the California Congressional delegation – in particular the efforts of then Congresswoman Jane Harman – and a supportive coalition of business, community and government leaders. Given that California came out of that process fairly unscathed, many fear that California could experience a substantial cut during the next round of BRAC.¶ SCLC’s Position¶ SCLC supports efforts to preserve and strengthen California’s defense complex and the jobs and economic infusion that are generated by the military’s presence in the state.¶ As sequestration is confronted and the next rounds of BRAC occur, SCLC believes these important messages are critical in making the case for California:¶ The impact of military spending in California, with respect to jobs and economic infusion, is substantial and must not be put at risk.¶ California plays a vital role in defending our nation today and in preparing America for the threats of the future.¶ In a world in which the threat matrix is increasingly weighted toward Asia and the Pacific, and in which technology plays an increased role in effective defense, California’s national security role is greater now than in the past.¶ California offers the best combination of technology, industry and academia in support of military needs, today and in the future.¶ California provides the best opportunities for joint training and operations in the U. S.¶ California’s unique value lies in the interconnectedness and close proximity of its large un-encroached military desert lands and nearby mountainous terrain, the largest restricted airspace in the U. S. and extensive deepwater operating areas off its coast.[1]

#### Asia conflict likely and goes nuclear war

Landy, National Security Expert @ Knight Ridder, 3/10/2000

(Jonathan, Knight Ridder, lexis)

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. “Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia \_ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources \_ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

#### SMRs uniquely unpopular because deployed closer to population centers

ITA, 11

Department Commerce, International Trade Administration, Feb, [http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg\_ian/@nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg\_ian\_003185.pdf](http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/%40tg_ian/%40nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003185.pdf)

One additional obstacle is beyond the scope of ¶ this report but could play a significant role in ¶ whether SMRs are commercially deployed: public ¶ opinion. To the extent that the smaller profile of ¶ SMRs results in their deployment closer to population centers, public opposition to their deployment might rise. Deployment at existing sites, or ¶ in industrial applications away from residential ¶ areas, however, might minimize the impact ¶ of public opinion. Education about the safety ¶ features of SMRs and nuclear reactors in general ¶ could also ameliorate this concern.

#### Opposition is more vocal, organized and aggressive in siting fights

Angwin, 12

Meredith Angwin, former project manager at EPRI, Electric Power Research Institute, 7/18/12, <http://yesvy.blogspot.com/2012/07/american-nuclear-society-awards-to.html#.UGdpiE2Clq1>

The importance of community¶ Some people advocate raising school taxes and others disagree. Both sides feel fine about expressing their views in public forums. Both sides know that plenty of people disagree with them, but they also know that most people are going to keep it civil, and those who don't keep it civil will not be supported in their rudeness. ¶ In contrast, people supporting nuclear power in Vermont are likely to feel intimidated by the opposition. Opponents shout at meetings. They drive NRC officials out of the room or throw manure in their water glasses. There was arson at Vermont Yankee's office building. (The office building is not on the plant site.) The people who do these things are applauded by the other opponents.¶ In my opinion, one of the reasons that the opponents can get away with this type of action is that so few supporters bother to show up at hearings and so forth. If there were more of us at the meetings, less intimidation would be possible

## 1NR

### grid adv

#### Grid resilient

Clark 2012 (Paul Clark, MA candidate in Intelligence Studies at American Military University, April 28, 2012, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” American Military University, online)

In 2003, a simple physical breakdown occurred – trees shorted a power line and caused a¶ fault – that had a cascading effect and caused a power blackout across the Northeast (Lewis¶ 2010). This singular occurrence has been used as evidence that the electrical grid is fragile and¶ subject to severe disruption through cyber-attack, a disruption that could cost billions of dollars,¶ brings business to a halt, and could even endanger lives – if compounded by other catastrophic¶ events (Brennan 2012). A power disruption the size of the 2003 blackout, the worst in American¶ history at that time (Minkel 2008), is a worst case scenario and used as an example of the¶ fragility of the U.S. energy grid. This perceived fragility is not real when viewed in the context¶ of the robustness of the electrical grid.¶ When asked about cyber-attacks against the electrical grid in April of 2012, the¶ intelligence chief of U.S. Cyber Command Rear Admiral Samuel Cox stated that an attack was¶ unlikely to succeed because of the “huge amounts of resiliency built into the [electrical] system¶ that makes that kind of catastrophic thing very difficult” (Capaccio 2012). This optimistic view¶ is supported by an electrical grid that has proven to be robust in the face of large natural¶ catastrophes. Complex systems like the electrical grid in the U.S. are prone to failures and the¶ U.S. grid fails frequently. Despite efforts to reduce the risk out power outages, the risk is always¶ present. Power outages that affect more than 50,000 people have occurred steadily over the last¶ 20 years at a rate of 12% annually and the frequency of large catastrophes remains relatively¶ high and outages the size of the 2003 blackout are predicted to occur every 25 years (Minkel¶ 2008). In a complex system that is always at risk of disruption, the effect is mitigated by policies¶ and procedures that are meant to restore services as quickly as possible. The most visible of these policies is the interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a legally binding¶ agreement allowing combined resources to be quickly deployed in response to a catastrophic¶ disaster such as power outages following a severe hurricane (Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev¶ 2009).¶ The electrical grid suffers service interruptions regularly, it is a large and complex system¶ supporting the largest economy in the world, and yet commerce does not collapse (Lewis 2010).¶ Despite blizzards, earthquakes, fires, and hurricanes that cause blackouts, the economy is¶ affected but does not collapse and even after massive damage like that caused by Hurricane¶ Katrina, national security is not affected because U.S. military capability is not degraded (Lewis¶ 2010).¶ Cyber-security is an ever-increasing concern in an increasingly electronic and¶ interconnected world. Cyber-security is a high priority “economic and national security¶ challenge” (National Security Council n.d.) because cyber-attacks are expected to become the¶ top national security threat (Robert S. Mueller 2012). In response to the threat Congress is¶ crafting legislation to enhance cyber-security (Brito and Watkins 2012) and the Department of¶ Homeland Security budget for cyber-security has been significantly increased (U.S. Senate¶ Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2012).

#### Microgrids solve and are coming online now

Pike Research 2011 (Pike Research, market research and consulting firm, September 16, 2011,

http://www.pikeresearch.com/newsroom/military-microgrid-capacity-to-experience-more-than-700-growth-by-2017)

The United States Department of Defense (DOD) is the single largest consumer of petroleum in the world. U.S. military operations are also the largest consumer of all forms of energy globally. Microgrids, which enable distributed energy generation at a localized scale including the ability to “island” themselves from larger utility grids, can shrink the amount of fossil fuels consumed to create electricity by networking generators as a system to maximize efficiency. Microgrids enable military bases – both stationary and tactical – to sustain operations no matter what is happening on the larger utility grid or in the theater of war. ¶ According to a new report from Pike Research, the capacity of military microgrids will grow at a rate of 739% between 2011 and 2017, increasing from 38 megawatts (MW) to 316 MW during that period, under a baseline forecast scenario. The cleantech market intelligence firm expects that, under a more aggressive adoption scenario, stationary and mobile military microgrid capacity could reach as high as 817 MW during the same timeframe.¶ “The military’s primary concern is disruption of service from utility transmission and distribution lines,” says senior analyst Peter Asmus. “The lack of control and ownership of these lines – and the uneven quality of power service regionally throughout the United States – has prompted the DOD to reexamine the existing electricity service delivery model. This analysis has led the DOD to the inevitable conclusion that the best way to bolster its ability to secure power may well be through microgrid technology it can own and control.”¶ Asmus adds that, as awareness about the electrical grid’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks has increased in recent times, the U.S. military has become one of the strongest proponents of microgrids, which offer the ultimate secure power supply for fixed base mobile operations. Many army, navy, air force, and other related bases and offices already have vintage microgrids in place. What is new, says Asmus, is that these facilities are looking to envelop entire bases with microgrids and integrate distributed energy generation on-site. These resources, when capable of safe islanding from the surrounding grid, offer the ultimate security since fuel never runs out with renewable energy resources such as solar or wind. The opportunity to help develop these microgrids has attracted a number of powerful technology companies including Lockheed Martin, GE, Honeywell, Boeing, and Eaton.

#### Cyber warfare threats are exaggerated – too many vested interests for accurate predictions

Jerry Brito (senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center and directs the Technology Policy Program at George Mason University) and Tate Watkins (research associate for the Technology Policy Program and the State and Local Policy Project at George Mason University) April 26, 2011 “Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy” <http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/WP1124_Loving_cyber_bomb.pdf>

An industrial complex reminiscent of the Cold War‘s may be emerging in cybersecurity today. Some serious threats may exist, but we have also seen evidence of threat inflation. Alarm raised over potential cyber threats has led to a cyber industry build-up and political competition over cyber pork. 1. Build-up In many cases, those now inflating the scope and probability of cyber threats might well benefit from increased regulation and more government spending on information security. Cybersecurity is a big and booming industry.163 The U.S. government is expected to spend $10.5 billion per year on information security by 2015, and analysts have estimated the worldwide market to be as much as $140 billion per year.164 The Department of Defense has also said it is seeking more than $3.2 billion in cybersecurityfunding for 2012.16In recent years, in addition to traditional information security providers like MacAfee, Symantec, and Checkpoint, defense contractors and consulting firms have recognized lucrative opportunities in cybersecurity.166 To weather probable cuts on traditional defense spending, and to take advantage of the growing market, these firms have positioned themselves to compete with information security firms for government contracts.167 Lockheed Martin, Boeing, L-3 Communications, SAIC, and BAE Systems have all launched cybersecurity business divisions in recent years.168 Other traditional defense contractors, like Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and ManTech International, have also invested in information security products and services.169 Such investments appear to have positioned defense firms well. In 2009, the top 10 information technology federal contractors included Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Raytheon, SAIC, L-3 Communications, and Booz Allen Hamilton.170 Traditional IT firms also see more opportunities to profit from cybersecurity business in both the public and private sectors.171 Earlier this year, a software security company executive noted ―a very large rise in interest in spending on computer security by the government.‖172 And as one IT market analyst put it: ―It‘s a cyber war and we‘re fighting it. In order to fight it, you need to spend more money, and some of the core beneficiaries of that trend will be the security software companies.‖173 Some companies from diverse industries have also combined forces in the cybersecurity buildup. In 2009, a combination of defense, security, and tech companies, including Lockheed, McAfee, Symantec, Cisco, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Intel, Juniper Networks, and Microsoft, formed a cybersecurity technology alliance to study threats and innovate solutions.174 IT lobbyists, too, have looked forward to cybersecurity budget increases, to the dismay of at least one executive at a small tech firm, who claimed, ―Money gets spent on the vendors who spend millions lobbying Congress.‖175 There are serious real online threats, and security firms, government agencies, the military, and private companies clearly must invest to protect against such threats. But as with the Cold War bomber and missile gap frenzies, we must be wary of parties with vested interests exaggerating threats, leading to unjustified and superfluous defense spending in the name of national security.

#### Cross Strait Interdependence

Yang 2005 (Philip Yang, phD. National taiwan University, Rise of China and the Cross-Strait Relations. Paper Presented at the 5th Europe Northeast Asia Forum. 2005. http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get\_document.php?asset\_id=2705)

The current economic trend across the Taiwan Strait fits into the neo-mercantalist viewpoints about globalization, which cliam that interdependence has not only altered the way people related with each other but eventually, becomes an arena for power struggle among states. China believes that the increasing cross-strait economic and social integration has become a unification enhancing mechanism, rather than a limit on its cross-strait policy. However, the interdependence argument cuts both ways. Cross-strait trade and investments are as much an advantage to Taiwan as a disadvantage. The huge Taiwanese investment in China means also extremely high economic costs for the Mainland should the latter opt for conflict. Taiwanese scholars argue that the cross-strait interdependence makes Taiwan overy dependent on the mainland as such a hostage to Beijing's manipulation. It is perhaps right that economic interdependence constrains China less than Taiwan due to the much larger economic scale of the former. Nevertheless, increasing cross-strait economic and social interdependence and integration may develop to be a restraining factor on provocative talks or policies for the both sides. As the economic and social interactions grow, the costs of either Beijing's resorting to military means for unification or Taipei's resurgence of a reckless de jure independence would become increasingly prohibitive.

### Leadership adv

#### Prefer our evidence - their lit base is all lobbyist scaremongering

Steve Kidd (Director of Strategy & Research at the World Nuclear Association, where he has worked since 1995 (when it was the Uranium Institute)) June 2010 “Nuclear proliferation risk – is it vastly overrated?” http://www.waterpowermagazine.com/story.asp?sc=2056931

The real problem is that nuclear non-proliferation and security have powerful lobby groups behind them, largely claiming to have nothing against nuclear power as such, apart from the dangers of misuse of nuclear technology. In fact in Washington DC, home of the US federal government, there is a cottage industry of lobby groups dedicated to this. Those who oppose their scaremongering (and it essentially amounts to no more than this) are castigated as being in the industry’s pocket or acting unresponsively to allegedly genuinely expressed public fears. Pointing out that very few new countries will acquire nuclear power by even 2030, and that very few of these will likely express any interest in acquiring enrichment or reprocessing facilities, seems to go completely over their heads. In any case, nuclear fuel cycle technologies are very expensive to acquire and it makes perfect sense to buy nuclear fuel from the existing commercial international supply chain. This already guarantees security of supply, so moves towards international fuel banks are essentially irrelevant, while measures supposedly to increase the proliferation resistance of the fuel cycle are unwarranted, particularly if they impose additional costs on the industry

#### An increase in soft power would give the government in China the leverage necessary to raise the value of their currency – China is reluctant to reevaluate due to political resistance.

Joseph S. Nye, 3-14-2011, Ph.D. in political science from Harvard, was Director of the Center for International Affairs, was Deputy to the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, chaired the National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, was chairman of the National Intelligence Council, served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, awarded the Woodrow Wilson Prize by Princeton University and the Humphrey Prize by the American Political Science Association, Editorial Board of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, CNN World, “Joe Nye answers your questions on China,” <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/14/joe-nye-answers-your-questions-on-china/>

Is “soft power” enough to make China raise the value of their currency, or will “hard power” become necessary? Soft power didn't seem to work at the G-20. Joe Nye: Hard power is the ability to get preferred outcomes by coercion or payment; soft power relies on attraction and persuasion. Both have some role in the issue of the revaluation of the renminbi. The congressional threat of tariffs and quotas is an example of hard power. While it may have caught Chinese attention, it has not alone solved the problem. The efforts at the G-20 to develop a consensus that the world needs to do something about global imbalances is an example of persuasion and soft power. That has not solved the problem either, but it holds some promise for the future. Interestingly, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan sets goals of increasing domestic consumption, reducing dependence on export industries and shifting growth from the coast to the interior of the country. A revaluation of the renminbi would promote these goals and help stem the inflation that has now become a major concern in China. When I have asked Chinese economists why they don’t revalue since it is in China’s interest, they reply that it is because of the political resistance from the coastal export industries and associated party officials. This suggests that persuasion could gradually help shift the internal balance of forces inside China.

#### Collapses the CCP.

Knowledge Wharton, 3-8-2011, “The Hu-Obama Summit: Big on Symbolism, Less So on Substance,” <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/arabic/article.cfm?articleid=2632&language_id=1>

One upshot of 2010's tensions? A lot of misunderstanding in the East and the West, states Liu Wei, a political science professor at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, China. He says what is viewed in the West as foot-dragging or lack of cooperation in China is often due to Chinese politicians' inexperience in international politics and efforts to get a grip on the inner workings of Western democracy. "Chinese leadership talks a lot, but they do not really understand U.S. domestic politics." On the flip side, Liu describes the U.S.'s argument that China's cheap labor is taking jobs from the U.S. as "simplistic." If jobs are lost in China, he adds, Americans need reminding that those jobs would not necessarily end up in the U.S., but in even lower cost countries. According to Liu, the reason for Beijing policy makers' cautious steps with the RMB is a "big fear" that their country could be destabilized by economic or trade policies that are aimed at rectifying global trade imbalances in the long run, but may throw China's economy off course in the short term -- at a time when the country is in the process of encouraging more internationalization of its currency with RMB-denominated financial instruments. It is not in anyone's interest, he says, for China to see factory closures, rampant unemployment and potentially large waves of civil unrest, which has in fact already begun. Global economies are interlinked to such an extent today, Liu notes, that "if China can't create more jobs, it will be a disaster, not just for China or for the U.S., but for the whole world."

#### This causes hyper-nationalist power plays and demographic shifts that will cause conflict with Russia, Japan, and Central Asia.

Brian Nichiporuk, Fall 2007, Political Scientist @ Rand Specializing in Demographic Trends in the Middle East and Central Asia, “Demography and Security in East Asia," National Strategy Forum, Lexis Nexis

Throughout much of modern European history, the main path through which demography was thought to cause conflict was changes in the balance of power between states. For example, the dramatic change in the ratio of total populations between France and Germany in the 1880-1940 period was one of the main causes of the change in the military balance between the two states, a change that favored Germany to the extent that Great Britain was compelled to adopt the role of a long-term external balancer to Germany on the European continent. However, in East Asia today we do not find any cases where demography itself is working to change the balance of power between major states. The maritime nature of much of this theater, advances in military technology, and the absence of any high population growth state from the region easily explain this fact. Instead, we find that demography affects the sources of regional conflict in two ways: through the possibility of large-scale domestic instability in China that would change the character of the Chinese regime, and through migratory flows. A number of East Asian experts have pointed out that China is one of the first nations in history that will become old before it becomes rich. Indeed, this process is already starting. Eberstadt has calculated that, when Japan had the same age profile as China does today, its per capita GDP was three times greater than China’s. There are security implications associated with this since China does not have the kind of stable pension or social security system that is found in most aging nations of the developed world. Family members are still viewed as a primary means of financial support to the elderly in China. If China comes to face a major economic crisis as a result of a failure of the banking system, a crash of the stock market, a spike in oil prices, or an increase in trade barriers in the US and Europe, large numbers of elderly people (who will be a rapidly growing segment of the total population) will be destitute and desperate if the working age members of their family are unemployed or see a drastic decline in earnings/savings. The resulting social tensions could lead to an upsurge in protests and urban civil unrest of the kind that was discussed earlier in this paper. Traditionally, urban civil strife has been more dangerous to the regime in power in China than rural unrest because cities are the centers of media, information, and economic activity; instability in urban areas strikes directly at China’s major centers of gravity. Given the CCP’s large-scale domestic security apparatus, it is unlikely that this kind of demographically-influenced unrest will topple the regime. However, it is very possible that the regime could respond to such a crisis by playing the nationalism card, i.e., transforming itself into a virulently nationalist regime to win back the sympathy of the Chinese populace. Such an approach has been used many times in the past by authoritarian regimes that faced economic meltdowns. The Galtieri regime in Argentina in the early 1980s is one such example. A turn toward hyper-nationalism in China would be extremely dangerous for the region because the regime would probably feel compelled to take aggressive actions against some of its neighbors to reinforce its new nationalist credentials with the people. Although Taiwan might seem to be the most obvious target, many of today’s China experts are increasingly concerned about the increasing anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese general public as a result of Japan’s apparent unwillingness to fully atone for its war crimes in China during World War II. Thus, one plausible scenario for a newly hyper-nationalist China would be a series of aggressive air and naval actions designed to stake its claims to the disputed islands and oil/natural gas deposits in the East China Sea. Low-level incidents involving Chinese submarines and Japanese destroyers and patrol aircraft have already occurred in this area during the past couple of years and it would not take much of a provocation by the Chinese Navy or Air Force to increase the risk of actual war. Needless to say, a China-Japan war in the East China Sea would be catastrophic for regional stability and might well draw the US in on the side of Japan, thus ushering in a long-term period of confrontation between the US and China. Such a conflict would also increase the likelihood that Japan would build its own nuclear arsenal, kicking of an intra-East Asian nuclear arms race. Migratory flows in East Asia also carry with them a risk of conflict, although much lower than that seen in the immediately preceding scenario. The steady flow of Chinese migrants into the Russian Far East could over time increase the fear in Moscow that the Far Eastern provinces were being "colonized" by China, especially if Russia’s dire demographic situation does not improve. This would likely disrupt the emerging Sino-Russian entente and cause the two countries to compete more aggressively for influence in the oil and gas producing regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus.

#### Soft power emboldens North Korea and Iran - causes aggression.

Jeffrey T. Kuhner, 6-6-2009, president of the Edmund Burke Institute, a Washington think tank,

Washington Times, “Another Korean War?,” <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/06/another-korean-war/>

North Korea threatens to engulf the Korean Peninsula in an all-out war. Pyongyang's recent test of a nuclear bomb poses a serious threat to international security and regional stability. Dictator Kim Jong-il continues to thumb his nose at global leaders, especially President Obama. The ailing strongman has denuded Mr. Obama on the world stage, revealing his soft-power strategy to be ineffective and reckless. Washington's emphasis on diplomacy was supposed to facilitate rogue states into increased cooperation. Instead, it has only emboldened the likes of North Korea (and Iran) to press ahead with their nuclear-weapons programs. Mr. Obama's "open hand" has been met with Mr. Kim's iron fist - one that has smashed Uncle Sam in the face.

#### Heg doesn’t solve war

Barbara Conry (former associate policy analyst, was a public relations consultant at Hensley Segal Rentschler and an expert on security issues in the Middle East, Western Europe, and Central Asia at the CATO Institute) and Charles V. Pena (Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute as well as a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, and an adviser on the Straus Military Reform Project at the CATO Institute) 2003 “47. US Security Strategy” CATO Handbook for Congress, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-47.pdf

Another rationale for attempting to manage global security is that a world without U.S. hegemony would soon degenerate into a tangle of chaos and instability, in which weapons proliferation, genocide, terrorism, and other offensive activities would be rampant. Prophets of such a development hint that if the United States fails to exercise robust political and military leadership today, the world is condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th century—or perhaps do something even worse. Such thinking is seriously flawed. First, instability in the international system is nothing new, and most episodes do not affect U.S. vital interests. Furthermore, to assert that U.S. global leadership can stave off otherwise inevitable global chaos vastly overstates the power of any single country to influence world events. Indeed, many of the problems that plague the world today, such as civil wars and ethnic strife, are largely impervious to external solutions. There is little to back up an assertion that only Washington’s management of international security can save the world from political, economic, or military conflagration.

#### Empirically proven

Christopher J. Fettweis (Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College) 2010 “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.